SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/11/2011 7:12 PM

ARTICLE

HEALTH CARE REFORM’S WILD CARD: THE UNCERTAIN
EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH

R ICHARD S. S AVER

†

Comparative effectiveness research (CER) stands out as the intriguing wild
card of health care reform. CER compares competing treatments against each
other to determine which interventions work best, supplying critical information
for medical decisionmaking and health policy. If CER works as planned, it
may be one of the few reform measures in the final health care legislation that
could flatten the cost curve while also improving quality. Unfortunately,
health care reform has so far failed to bet smart and play the CER wild card effectively. While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act invests in CER
at record levels and creates an entirely new regulatory framework for oversight
of the research, the new law does very little to advance the difficult work of
translating CER into actual medical practice. First, CER is costly to conduct
and its data often raise more questions than answers. Second, the government’s CER agenda seems vague and ill-defined, not consistently focusing on
generating research that will help clinicians resolve immediate treatment questions. Third, and most important, physicians likely will remain indifferent to
and “tune out” CER. Health law and policy are not setting the right incentives for physicians to adapt their practice patterns to CER and, in some respects, exacerbate the physician-engagement difficulties. The reasons for physician indifference to CER include: lack of financial incentives, suspicions of
industry bias in the public/private oversight of the research, threats to clinical
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autonomy, a commitment to individualized medicine (encouraged by health
law, professional ethics, and medical norms) that remains in tension with
CER, concerns that CER is a vehicle for crude cost-cutting, and malpractice
liability fears. To be truly effective, the new national CER program requires
targeted reforms designed to engage physicians more directly with the research.
This Article’s principal suggestions include greater linkage of CER with reimbursement and liability incentives, enhanced use of academic detailing, and
more support for comparative implementation studies that evaluate different
strategies for fostering physician uptake of CER.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................2149
I.
BACKGROUND: CER STATUTORY PROVISIONS .............................2157
A. Previous CER Efforts .......................................................2157
B. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 .........2158
C. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ................... 2159
D. Definitional Issues...........................................................2160
E. Comparative Effectiveness Versus Cost-Effectiveness ..............2164
F. Limitations on Use of CER ............................................... 2166
II. INFORMATION GAPS AND WHAT DRIVES MEDICAL
DECISIONMAKING.........................................................................2170
III. TRANSLATION BARRIERS ..............................................................2175
A. Vagueness and Mission Creep ...........................................2176
B. Costly Studies That Raise More Questions Than Answers .....2177
1. Cost ........................................................................2178
2. Secondary Data, Less Rigorous Research
Methodologies, and Varying Measures
of Effectiveness ......................................................2178
3. Accounting for Individual Patient Differences ....2180
4. Accounting for Individual Provider Differences .2181
5. Keeping Pace with Innovation..............................2183
6. Uncertain Answers ................................................2184
C. Financial Incentives ........................................................ 2184
D. Bias and Public/Private Oversight ....................................2186
E. Clinical Autonomy and the Technological Imperative ...........2190
F. “Individualized” Medicine ...............................................2192
G. Liability Concerns ...........................................................2196
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................2198
A. Coverage Rules and Financial Incentives............................ 2199
B. Malpractice Liability Incentives.........................................2202
C. Academic Detailing .........................................................2203
D. Comparative Implementation Research ...............................2205
CONCLUSION........................................................................................2206

SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Health Care Reform’s Wild Card

6/11/2011 7:12 PM

2149

INTRODUCTION
Despite the recent enactment of historic health care reform legisla1
tion, serious questions remain whether the entire health care overhaul
will implode. Many health policy experts believe that the new law, in
primarily focusing on access, does not sufficiently address intractable
2
cost and quality problems in the health care system. The public shares
3
these concerns. As the debate continues, comparative effectiveness research (CER) stands out as the intriguing wild card of health care
reform. CER is one of the few reform provisions in the final legislation
that, if deployed properly, offers a plausible opportunity to bend the
cost curve while also improving the quality of care. Indeed, CER proponents optimistically claim that, over the long haul, CER can radically

1

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
2
See, e.g., Elenora E. Connors & Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Care Reform—A Historic Moment in US Social Policy, 303 JAMA 2521, 2522 (2010) (“The United States, however, missed a unique opportunity to significantly reduce medical costs and improve
quality.”); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Michael J. Ramlet, Health Care Reform Is Likely to Widen Federal Budget Deficits, Not Reduce Them, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1136, 1136-40 (2010) (detailing methodological problems with government projections that found PPACA
would reduce the budget deficit); Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Systemwide
Cost Control—The Missing Link in Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131, 113133 (2009) (emphasizing that the new law does not restrain spending); Gina Kolata,
Law May Do Little to Help Curb Unnecessary Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at D1 (concluding that the new bill does little to help reduce the “nation’s chronic overuse of
medical care”); David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Health Reform a
“Game Changer?” 16-21 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. LE10-010, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624311 (making predictions about the cost implications of the new legislation); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Health Care Law’s Unfinished
Business: Cost Curbs, ABC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
wireStory?id=10470267 (discussing the failure of the health care bill to control costs).
Other commentators, including the former director of the White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the special health policy advisor of the OMB,
remain more optimistic. See Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform
and Cost Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 601 (2010) (responding to concerns that the
new law would increase the deficit).
3
See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL
1-4 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8084-F.pdf (finding
forty-six percent of seniors polled had an unfavorable view of the new law and were
concerned about high costs and benefit cuts that could harm quality of care); Mark
Trumbull, Opinion Polls: Obama’s Health Care Reform Law Not a Winner So Far, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0330/
Opinion-polls-Obama-s-health-care-reform-law-not-a-winner-so-far (noting voters’ concerns that the new law will “erode the quality of care and jack up costs”) .
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4

transform the practice of medicine. Unfortunately, health care reform
has so far failed to bet smart and play the CER wild card effectively.
While there are varying and sometimes inconsistent definitions of
5
CER, it involves, at bottom, comparing competing medical treatments
against each other to determine which interventions work best. The
new governmental push for CER responds to increasing concerns that
physicians often make clinical decisions without a solid foundation of
credible medical evidence, particularly evidence as to how treatments
compare to each other. A recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report
suggests that sound scientific studies support less than half of the
6
treatments that physicians recommend. Uncertainties arising from
this information gap contribute to unexpected variations in the
treatment of patients with similar conditions and can result in costly,
7
ineffective, and even dangerous medical care.
Health care reform has led to both heavy investment in CER and
the creation of a new regulatory framework for oversight of the research. Congress took the first major step with the federal stimulus
legislation by including an appropriation of $1.1 billion to fund CER
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the

4

See, e.g., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM’N ON A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH
SYS., BENDING THE CURVE: OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SAVINGS AND IMPROVING VALUE IN
U.S. HEALTH SPENDING 19-21 (2007), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2007/Dec/Bending-the-Curve--Options-forAchieving-Savings-and-Improving-Value-in-U-S--Health-Spending.aspx (projecting the
benefits of a CER system); Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-Effectiveness
Research—The Oregon Experience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18, e18(1)-(3) (2010),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0912938 (arguing that CER can limit
future health care spending by following the example of the health care policies implemented in Oregon).
5
See infra Section I.D (discussing how definitional questions affect CER implementation).
6
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., LEARNING WHAT WORKS BEST: THE NATION’S
NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2007).
7
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2975, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 12 (2007) (“[T]he apparent variation in [treatment] norms indicates that
there is not sufficient evidence to determine which approach is most appropriate.”);
FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 3 (2009)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT] (describing some benefits to patients from
CER); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 80-84 (2009) (describing information gaps in research
that CER should aim to correct); Elliott S. Fisher et al., Slowing the Growth of Health Care
Costs—Lessons from Regional Variation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850-51 (2009) (discussing how variations in health care spending show that much care is unnecessary).
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8

Recovery Act). The recently enacted health care reform law, the Pa9
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), provides an additional stream of CER funding—up to $500 million per year by 2013 or
2014—and establishes a new oversight entity, the Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute (the PCOR Institute), to direct the na10
tion’s first comprehensive CER program.
CER attracts considerable enthusiasm as a tool for health care
reform because it differs from conventional medical research in important ways. Traditional studies ordinarily evaluate an experimental intervention’s general effectiveness by comparing it to a placebo. CER instead focuses on how effective treatments are relative to each other. In
other words, traditional research typically asks, “Does this work?” whereas CER asks the question practicing physicians really want to know:
11
“Is this better than that?” Also, conventional medical investigations
usually evaluate new technology under tightly controlled, highly artificial conditions that exclude many subjects, whereas CER includes
treatments already adopted in clinical practice and studies populations
12
more representative of typical patients. As such, CER promises to develop better information for medical decisionmaking in real world settings. In theory, better information will translate to better medical care.
Various commentators predict that CER has the power “to reshape ma13
jor portions of the practice of medicine,” that it provides “the scientific
14
scaffolding for . . . revolution” in medical practice, and that it ushers
15
health care into a new “era of comparative effectiveness.”

8

Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (to be codified in scattered sections of 6,
19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
9
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 727-38 (2010) (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
10
See infra Section I.C (discussing the creation of the PCOR Institute).
11
Harold C. Sox & Sheldon Greenfield, Comparative Effectiveness Research: A Report
from the Institute of Medicine, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 203, 204 (2009).
12
See infra Section I.D.
13
Mohammad N. Akhter & Richard A. Levinson, Editorial, Comparative Effectiveness
Research and the Future Practice of Medicine, 101 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 1301, 1301 (2009).
14
Bob Wachter, Are We Mature Enough to Make Use of Comparative Effectiveness Research?,
WACHTER’S WORLD (Feb. 21, 2009, 5:48 AM), http://community.the-hospitalist.org/
blogs/wachters_world/archive/2009/02/21/are-we-mature-enough-to-make-use-ofcomparative-effectiveness-research.aspx.
15
Joe Jancsurak, Ushering in an Era of “Comparative Effectiveness,” MED. DESIGN (Feb.
19, 2009, 9:23 AM), http://medicaldesign.com/letters/comparative_effectiveness_
0209 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Susan Dentzer, Comparative Effectiveness: Coherent Health Care at Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1756, 1756 (2010) (describing comparative effectiveness research as a “turning point” for American society).
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Rather than revolutionizing medicine, however, this Article cautions that the emerging era of comparative effectiveness is in danger of
becoming disappointingly ineffective. Serious legal and policy obstacles
jeopardize the health care system’s ability to make productive use of governmentally funded CER.
First, CER already has considerable political baggage after being
swept into the larger, acrimonious battles over health care reform.
Opponents of the Democrats’ health care proposals pointedly focused
16
on CER, charging that it would lead to rationing of health care, go17
vernmental interference in the doctor-patient relationship, and, more
18
ominously, the empowerment of “death panels.” Also, stakeholders
waged hard-fought turf battles over how to administer the new national
CER program. The new reform law jettisons the federal-commission
19
approach of previous legislation in favor of ceding direct authority to
private interests through creation of the PCOR Institute, a nonprofit
corporation that will include drug, device, and insurance company
20
representatives on its governing board. CER faces longer-term political risks as well. Various physician groups, drug companies, and device manufacturers understandably view CER as a threat because the
research may question the necessity and value of their products and

16

See, e.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed., Stimulus Math for the GOP, WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
2009, at A19 (“The CER . . . would dramatically advance government control—and rationing—of health care . . . .”); see also Jerry Avorn, Debate About Funding ComparativeEffectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927, 1928-29 (2009) (discussing other political charges made against CER during the debate over health care reform).
17
See, e.g., Betsy McCaughey, Ruin Your Health with the Obama Stimulus Plan (Feb. 9,
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLzfDxfbwhzs
(objecting to provisions that would “guide” doctors’ decisions).
18
See, e.g., Victoria Colliver, Stimulus Prompts Talk of Health Care Rationing, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 12, 2009, at A12 (explaining the views of CER opponents); Joseph Ashby,
“Death Panel” Is Not in the Bill . . . It Already Exists, AM. THINKER (Aug. 15, 2009),
http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/08/death_panel_is_not_in_the_bill.html (characterizing CER as leading to “death panels”); Peter Ferrara, The Absolutely Worst Bill Ever, AM. SPECTATOR (Nov. 11, 2009, 6:08 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/
2009/11/11/the-absolutely-worst-bill-ever (describing “death panels” as groups that
“have the power to ration and deny you health care”).
19
The earlier Recovery Act had created the Federal Coordinating Council for
Comparative Effectiveness Research, an entity akin to a federal commission, to direct
the government’s new CER program. See infra Section I.B.
20
See infra Section I.C. Other proposals for administering a national CER program have included folding CER activities into existing agencies such as the National
Institutes of Health or the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. See, e.g.,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 15-19 (suggesting organizational strategies for
CER oversight); Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information, 25 HEALTH AFF. 572 (2006) (describing necessary attributes for CER oversight).
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services. These powerful stakeholders can be expected to use the political process to discredit certain studies and to weaken governmental
21
support for CER more generally, as has happened in the past.
While not minimizing these obstacles, this Article contends that
health care reform’s new push for CER faces a more fundamental
problem: lawmakers have essentially defanged CER, deploying it under conditions that will leave it underpowered. In part to appease
critics who fear that CER will lead to rationing and crude cost control,
a great deal of legislative and political attention has been devoted to
22
restricting its use. This leaves unresolved the critical question—what
will be done with the information?
Not much. Many physicians seem unlikely to change clinical practice patterns, notwithstanding the outcomes of CER studies. Health
law and policy are not setting the right incentives for physicians to incorporate CER into regular clinical practice and, in some respects, exacerbate the physician-engagement difficulties. This Article explores
why. It also considers how health law and policy tools could better
support CER’s translation into medical practice.
A key assumption of this Article is that the success of the government’s new CER program depends most on targeted physician engagement. The intended audience for a national CER program certainly includes other stakeholders. As CER proponents maintain,
comparative effectiveness evidence should empower patients and payers as consumers of health care, equipping them with better informa23
tion to navigate the complicated health care system. But as a practical matter, very little can be accomplished without meaningful
physician participation. Although new models of shared decision-

21

For example, the now-defunct Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR) issued reports in the mid-1990s questioning the efficacy of common back surgeries. A political backlash, led by surgeon groups and medical device manufacturers,
resulted in considerable budget reductions for AHCPR and new limitations on the agency’s authority. See MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 632, A BETTER
WAY TO GENERATE AND USE COMPARATIVE-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 7-8 (2009) (cautioning about the dangers of politicization when a federal agency controls research).
22
See infra Section I.F.
23
See, e.g., FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4 (“Patients increasingly and appropriately want to take responsibility for their care. Therefore we have a
responsibility to provide comparative information to enable informed decisionmaking. This patient-centered, pragmatic, ‘real world’ research is a fundamental requirement for improving care for all Americans.”); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., supra note 6, at 6 (“Insurers perhaps most acutely feel the need for much more
reliable, rigorous, transparent, and impartial comparative effectiveness information to
make decisions in the growing marketplace of medical interventions.”).
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making between patients and physicians increasingly attract academic
24
and clinical interest, physicians continue to perform the fundamental role of gatekeeper. Because of information asymmetries and agency relationships, physicians can induce or control the bulk of health
25
care expenditures. The ability of health care payers to direct medical decisionmaking in the absence of physician agreement remains
26
questionable. Meanwhile, medical decisionmaking studies raise serious doubts that patients have sufficient capacity, resources, and motivation to use effectiveness information to challenge what their physi27
cians otherwise recommend.
24

“Shared decisionmaking” refers to a process in which the physician and patient
consider outcomes, probabilities, and the patient’s value preferences to reach mutual
agreement on a treatment plan. Shared decisionmaking is particularly recommended
for situations of medical uncertainty, as the process in part aims to inform the patient
about the limited predictive evidence and then determine how to proceed, accounting
for the patient’s personal value preferences. Shared decisionmaking differs from the
traditional legal-bioethics model of informed consent, which has emphasized the physician’s duty to disclose over joint participation in the decisionmaking. See generally Dominick L. Frosch & Robert M. Kaplan, Shared Decision Making in Clinical Medicine: Past Research and Future Directions, 17 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 285, 285 (1999) (reviewing
literature on shared decisionmaking and concluding that the process is “an important
development in health care”); Stacey L. Sheridan et al., Shared Decision Making About
Screening and Chemoprevention: A Suggested Approach from the U.S. Preventive Services Task
Force, 26 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 56, 59-60 (2004) (defining shared decisionmaking).
25
See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical
Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 356 (2001) (“Physicians influence or control approximately seventy-five percent of health care spending through their practice patterns.”);
Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1988) (estimating that individual practitioners control seventy to ninety percent of health care expenditures).
26
See, e.g., Ana I. Balsa et al., Clinical Uncertainty and Healthcare Disparities, 29 AM. J.L.
& MED. 203, 205 (2003) (noting that medical practice involves a great deal of physician
discretion and “[n]either insurance contracts nor ethical and legal rules do a great deal
to narrow the resulting clinical discretion”); Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm
of Medical Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 425 (1990) (“[P]ayers
are essentially locked into underwriting all care meeting professional standards.”).
27
For example, a recent study published in Health Affairs indicates that patients
have difficulty understanding what “quality guidelines” and “medical evidence” mean,
and that they are dubious about evidence-based information to the extent that it precludes the ability of their physicians to provide individually tailored care. Kristin L.
Carman et al., Evidence That Consumers Are Skeptical About Evidence-Based Health Care, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1400 (2010). The study suggests that, notwithstanding other credible
sources of information, patients will likely continue to “rely heavily on their doctors for
information, interpretation, and guidance on treatment options.” Id. at 1403. The
authors also concluded that patients’ beliefs and attitudes “are often incompatible with
evidence-based approaches” to medical care, such as CER. Id. at 1405. More generally, despite the theoretical appeal of the patient-as-consumer model, patients often perform poorly as consumers. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 644-66
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History cautions that it is not easy to change physician behavior,
even when good medical data justifies new approaches. Numerous
quality-improvement policy initiatives have stalled because information dissemination alone failed to engage physicians in the clinical
28
trenches. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office has questioned
whether a national CER program will generate significant cost savings,
in part because of doubts that practitioners will quickly adopt the new
29
evidence into actual health care delivery. Better effectiveness information does not necessarily affect the adoption of new medical technology or physicians’ ultimate choice of treatment. Medical practice
remains quite variable, significantly affected by nonclinical factors such
30
as reimbursement incentives and pharmaceutical marketing. This variability already presents numerous challenges for health law, compli31
cating medical-technology regulation and frustrating the malpractice
32
system’s attempts to define a uniform standard of care.
No doubt, the concerns raised here about CER’s future viability
may seem unduly pessimistic and even counterintuitive. After all,

(2008); Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health
Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 59-65 (2009).
28
See, e.g., Valerie Weber & Maulik S. Joshi, Effecting and Leading Change in Health
Care Organizations, 26 J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 388, 388-92 (2000) (discussing the limited success of Total Quality Management (TQM) and Quality Improvement (QI)
initiatives in hospitals in the 1990s because of lack of physician participation and, at
times, physician resistance to changing practice patterns).
29
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3185, BUDGET OPTIONS VOLUME 1: HEALTH
CARE 86-87 (2008); see also Mark McClellan & Joshua Benner, Comparative Effectiveness
Research: Will It Bend the Health Care Cost Curve and Improve Quality? (noting that critics
object that CER “evidence may be outdated by the time it is available”), in ENGELBERG
CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, BROOKINGS INST., IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH: PRIORITIES, METHODS, AND IMPACT 7, 9 (2009) [hereinafter
BROOKINGS INST.].
30
See infra Part II.
31
See, e.g., Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 394-400 (2002) (examining intricacies of postapproval drug regulation and how physicians deviate from approved uses);
Amy L. Wax, Technology Assessment and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 82 VA. L. REV. 1641,
1648-49 (1996) (noting that practitioners base their assessments of cost-benefit tradeoffs
for new technologies on “intuition, prejudice, anecdote, or unsubstantiated lore”).
32
See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 127 (1991) (“[M]edical science . . . thoroughly fails to conform to the legal ideal of an established standard of care. In most
instances, no such definitive standard exists.”); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea:
Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 636 (2003) (“Medical liability law reflects the paradox of wanting health insurers to be objective and consistent about coverage decisions when underlying medical practice is often neither.”).
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what’s not to like about CER? Special-interest-group politics aside,
why would ordinary physicians oppose gathering better medical evidence about how treatments compare to each other? Why would they
not find such research persuasive? Investigating the relative effectiveness of medical treatments seems inherently positive. Some even view
it as a public good, particularly deserving of special governmental
33
support. Also, CER seems a rather neutral reform strategy that, in
theory, should appeal to different ends of the political spectrum.
Both market-based and regulatory-based approaches for improving
health care depend on the availability of good information about the
relative value of different medical treatments. Knowledge gaps about
differences in the quality of care affect not only patients, but also pro34
viders, payers, and regulators, contributing to many system problems.
Stimulating the production of better information and facilitating data
transparency are preferred strategies for advancing important health
35
law and policy objectives and for optimal regulation more generally.
Notwithstanding the theoretical merits of better information,
many physicians will remain skeptical, critical, or—most likely—indifferent about CER. Physicians in the clinical trenches lack strong incentives to consider CER in making medical-treatment decisions. Indeed, for a variety of reasons, they can be expected to “tune out” the
research and continue traditional practice patterns.
Part I of this Article analyzes the legislative background, including
statutory limitations on the use of CER. It also considers the unclear
boundaries between CER and cost-effectiveness analysis, an uncertainty
that fuels physicians’ fears about rationing and general distrust about
the governmental push for CER. Part II discusses why the health care
33

Compare MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REDELIVERY SYSTEM 107-08 (2008), available at http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/jun08_entirereport.pdf (“Because [CER] information can benefit all users
and is a public good, the Commission concluded a federal role is necessary to produce
the information and make it publicly available.”), with CANNON, supra note 21, at 1
(conceding that comparative effectiveness information has public-good characteristics
but questioning whether it should receive governmental support).
34
See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 6, at 2-3; David A. Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
221, 233-34 (2000).
35
See generally Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1577 (2007) (examining the information imperfections in health
care markets and how better data can improve regulation); William M. Sage, Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701
(1999) (discussing how greater availability of information can promote competition,
strengthen agency relationships, improve productive efficiency, ensure accountability,
and foster democratic decisionmaking).
FORMING THE
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system often lacks credible information about comparative effectiveness and briefly reviews the nonclinical factors that heavily influence
physician decisionmaking.
Part III explores the many barriers to translating CER into clinical
practice. The research is costly to conduct and may raise more questions than answers. Further, current plans for the national CER program seem overly expansive, extending to investigations that physicians likely will find less useful in resolving immediate treatment
decisions. Physicians can be expected to disregard CER for additional
reasons, including: lack of financial incentives, suspicions of industry
bias in the public/private oversight of the research, clinical autonomy
concerns, a commitment to individualized medicine (encouraged by
medical ethics, health law, and professional norms) that remains in
tension with CER, and malpractice-liability considerations.
Part IV offers legal and policy recommendations for improving the
translation of CER into medical practice. The principal suggestions
include greater linkage of CER with reimbursement and liability incentives, enhanced use of academic detailing to disseminate the research
information, and more funding for comparative implementation studies
that evaluate different strategies for fostering physician uptake of CER.
I. BACKGROUND: CER STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Previous CER Efforts
Combined, the Recovery Act and PPACA invest in CER at record
levels and create the nation’s first comprehensive CER program.
While governmental entities such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) have supported discrete CER activities in
36
the past, the size and scope of such efforts has been modest. No sin-

36

The Recovery Act gave $300 million in funding to the AHRQ for CER, an
amount roughly equal to the agency’s entire annual budget. Robert Steinbrook, Health
Care and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1058
(2009). Previous legislation only modestly supported CER—for example, the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 provided about $15
million per year in funding to AHRQ for research into outcomes and comparative clinical effectiveness of certain health care items and services. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1013(e),
117 Stat. 2066, 2438-41 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(e) (2006)); INST. OF MED. OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., supra note 6, at 2; GRETCHEN A. JACOBSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34208, COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH:
BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND OVERVIEW 24 (2007).
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gle federal agency has focused on CER as its primary activity. Private
CER efforts have also been limited and poorly coordinated, with re38
sults often not made publicly available. Moreover, past CER activities
have not employed common data infrastructures or followed consistent research methodologies, complicating efforts to share the infor39
mation and build upon earlier work.
B. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
40

In what was hailed as an initial “down payment” for a national
CER program, the Recovery Act of 2009 provided $1.1 billion in financial support for CER, allocated among the Department of Health
41
and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health, and AHRQ.
This funding was an unprecedented public investment in CER. The
Recovery Act also provided new oversight by creating a federalcommission-type entity, the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research (the Federal CER Council), to coordi42
nate CER efforts among the federal agencies.
In addition, the Recovery Act directed the IOM to prepare a comprehensive report recommending national priorities for CER after con43
sidering input from health-system stakeholders. The resulting IOM re44
port, issued in June 2009, listed one hundred “top priority” CER topics.

37

See ELIZABETH DOCTEUR & ROBERT BERENSON, URBAN INST., HOW WILL COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AFFECT THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE?: TIMELY
ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 5-6 (2010).
38

Critics have called private CER studies conducted by drug and device manufacturers biased because the studies tend to favor the sponsors’ products. Also, health plans
and other payers that conduct CER often do not make their studies available to the public. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 116-17. They are no
doubt concerned that their competitors would free-ride on their efforts. More generally,
private CER efforts have suffered from weak coordination and lack of consistent research
methods. Steven Pearson, From Better Evidence to Better Care: Using Comparative Effectiveness
Research to Guide Practice and Policy, in BROOKINGS INST., supra note 29, at 58-59.
39
FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13; INST. OF MED. OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 43-51; Pearson, supra note 38, at 58-59.
40
E.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, H.R. 1, THE “AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT
ACT OF 2009”: EXPLANATION OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH (CER) PROVISIONS, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/arra-cerprovisions.pdf; Sox & Greenfield, supra note 11, at 203.
41
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No.
111-5, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 176-77.
42
Recovery Act § 804, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8 (West Supp. 1A 2010).
43
See Recovery Act, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 177.
44
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 2.
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C. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
In a rather abrupt departure from the federal-commission-type approach of the previous year’s legislation, PPACA abolished the Federal
45
CER Council and replaced it with an entirely new oversight entity. Instead of employing a purely public oversight model, the new structure
cedes significant authority to private interests. A new private nonprofit
corporation, the PCOR Institute, will manage the nation’s CER pro46
gram. Various government officials, such as a representative from the
National Institutes of Health, will hold seats on the PCOR Institute’s
47
governing board. The majority of seats, however, are designated for
private stakeholders, including representatives of patients, health care
48
providers, drug and device manufacturers, and health insurers.
The statute empowers the PCOR Institute to establish national
CER priorities and to enter into contracts with government agencies
49
and private entities for carrying out various research projects. To assist in these efforts, the PCOR Institute may appoint expert advisory
50
panels. It is further tasked with developing a standing committee for
improving the methodological standards applied to funded CER in51
vestigations. Also, the PCOR Institute must ensure appropriate peer
52
review for research that it supports.

45

PPACA § 6302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8 note (West Supp. 1A 2010).
Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e.
47
Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(f).
48
The members of the PCOR Institute’s governing board are to include the Director of the National Institutes of Health and the Director of the AHRQ (or their designees). Id. In addition, the Comptroller General of the United States is to appoint additional members as follows: (1) three members representing patients and health care
consumers, (2) five members representing physicians and other health care providers,
(3) three members representing private payers, (4) three members representing drug
and device manufacturers, (5) one member representing quality-improvement or independent-health-services researchers, and (6) two members representing the federal
government or the states, including at least one member representing a federal agency
or federal health program. Id. The initial board of governors, selected by the
Comptroller General, includes officials from powerful drug and device firms Johnson
& Johnson, Medtronic, and Pfizer, and representatives from influential payers BlueCross BlueShield and Xerox. Press Release, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO
Announces Appointments to New Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
(PCORI) Board of Governors (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/press/
pcori2010sep23.html.
49
PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2).
50
Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(4).
51
Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2).
52
Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(e)(d)(7), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(7).
46
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In allocating CER funds, the PCOR Institute will have significant
resources at its disposal. Transfers from the Medicare program trust
funds, as well as revenue from a new tax on health plans, will finance a
53
new CER trust fund. The amount available starts at $10 million in
2010 but increases each year to reach an estimated $500 million per
54
year by 2013–2014. However, no expenditures may be made from
55
this trust fund after 2019. Importantly, PPACA precludes the PCOR
Institute from using CER to make coverage determinations or to develop practice guidelines and, similarly, sets narrow limits on federal
health plans’ ability to use CER for reimbursement decisions, as ex56
plained in further detail below.
D. Definitional Issues
The new laws fail to clarify many details about the national CER
program. First of all, it is not entirely certain what CER means. The
57
Recovery Act did not expressly define the term. Using the related
term “comparative clinical effectiveness research,” PPACA offers a
seemingly straightforward definition: “research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and bene58
fits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items.”
Nonetheless, questions remain. Does the inclusion of “services”
and “items” within the definition mean that entire health care delivery systems, not just specific treatments, may be compared? For example, could a funded study investigate whether a difference in effectiveness exists when a physician delivers the same underlying
treatment, such as the use of beta-blockers for chronic heart disease,
under a traditional fee-for-service system versus managed care? Even

53

Id. § 6301(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-2.
Id. § 6301(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9511; see also AM. ASS’N OF MED. COLLS., SUMMARY OF
PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH PROVISIONS 11 (2010) (discussing funding for
the PCOR trust fund); COAL. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, HEALTH REFORM: WHAT IT
MEANS FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 3 (2010), available at http://www.chsr.org/
CHSRReformSummary.pdf (estimating $500 million in funding per year by 2013); Alex
Nussbaum et al., Obamacare’s Cost Scalpel, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 2010, at 64, 64 (same).
55
PPACA § 6301(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9511.
56
See infra Section I.F.
57
The Recovery Act described CER only indirectly, and through broad, openended language, such as “research that compares the clinical outcomes, effectiveness,
and appropriateness of items, services, and procedures that are used to prevent, diagnose, or treat diseases, disorders, and other health conditions.” Recovery Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, tit. VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 177 (2009).
58
PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a).
54
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more important, does this definition contemplate comparison of the
59
costs of different treatments?
Of course, some degree of imprecision in the statutory definition of
CER might be useful. Perhaps Congress meant to avoid a rigid, inflexible approach and leave some discretion to regulators about which aspects of CER to emphasize in different circumstances. Nonetheless, the
definitional imprecision creates considerable ambiguity during the critical rollout phase of the new legislation. It also enables lawmakers to
avoid, perhaps indefinitely, directly addressing hard but critically important policy choices, such as whether CER should look at treatment costs.
The definitional problems should not be surprising. CER has
been an evolving concept, and it continues to mean different things
to different stakeholders. In recent years, various public and private
entities have developed numerous, and not always consistent, defini60
tions of CER.
In some respects, CER is merely the latest variation of the evidencebased medicine paradigm that has taken hold in medical practice over
61
the past two decades. However, CER involves more than just evidence59
60

See infra Section I.E.
The Federal CER Council defined CER as

the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the benefits and harms of
different interventions and strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor
health conditions in “real world” settings. The purpose of this research is to
improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based information to patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to
their expressed needs, about which interventions are most effective for which
patients under specific circumstances.
FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 16. The IOM defined CER somewhat
differently, through more of a public health orientation. The IOM definition expressly
included population health, not just individual patient experiences, in describing CER as
the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms
of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care. The purpose of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy makers to make informed decisions
that will improve health care at both the individual and population levels.
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 13 (emphasis added). Meanwhile,
the Congressional Budget Office had earlier defined CER as “a rigorous evaluation of
the impact of different options that are available for treating a given medical condition
for a particular set of patients.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3. For a comprehensive list of varying CER definitions that public and private entities adopted in
recent years, see INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 34-36 & tbl.2-1.
61
“Evidence-based medicine” looks to the results of clinical trials and comprehensive data analysis involving large populations of patients to guide individual treatment
decisions. It favors reliance on this type of information rather than physicians’ tendencies to make treatment decisions based on anecdotal reports from peers, unsyste-
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based medicine’s preference for using hard data over practitioner intuition and isolated clinical experiences. It is easiest to understand CER
by addressing what it is not—how it differs from conventional medical
research. First, most conceptions of CER stress the comparative aspects
of the work, the rigorous evaluation of how different treatments fare
relative to each other. CER thus differs from traditional evidence-based
medicine studies, such as clinical effectiveness or simply efficacy investigations, which look at an intervention in a more isolated fashion and ob62
serve whether it produces any therapeutic benefit.
A second distinguishing feature of CER is the pragmatic focus on
what happens under real world clinical conditions. Traditional clinical
efficacy studies typically occur under highly controlled, artificial circumstances. Subjects usually receive the exact same interventions in
the same uniform manner. Also, the traditional studies often exclude
individuals with additional medical problems, or who take multiple
medications, as well as individuals of varying age, gender, and health
63
backgrounds. Investigators apply these standardization techniques
and rigid eligibility criteria to isolate the effect of the studied interven64
tion. This narrow focus furthers scientific understanding of general
disease etiology and, in the case of investigational drugs and devices,
helps more efficiently satisfy the Food and Drug Administration
65
(FDA)’s regulatory approval criteria. However, this means that tradimatic observations from isolated clinical experiences, observations during medicaleducation training, and other less rigorous information sources. See Evidence-Based
Med. Working Grp., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of
Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420-25 (1992).
62
Sometimes “efficacy” and “effectiveness” are used interchangeably, but there is a
technical distinction. Efficacy studies test the given treatment under ideal, uniform
conditions that try to minimize the influence of other factors. Effectiveness studies test
the treatment under “messier” conditions, such as patients of different health status
and varying procedures for administering the treatment, to better represent the circumstances of actual clinical practice. See JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 4-5 (discussing
the difference between “effectiveness” and “efficacy”).
63
See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-21; JACOBSON, supra note
36, at 5.
64
See Common Questions About Clinical Trials, YALE CANCER CENTER, http://
www.yalecancercenter.org/trials/questions.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“Enrolling participants with similar characteristics helps to ensure that the results of the trial
will be due to what is under study and not other factors.”).
65
Investigational new drugs typically undergo different phases of clinical-trial testing to satisfy FDA approval criteria. Phase I studies establish levels of tolerance to determine safe dosage levels. If deemed nontoxic, a drug passes into Phase II, where it is
tested to demonstrate general efficacy and relative safety. Phase III studies involve expanded controlled and uncontrolled clinical trials and more comprehensive evaluations of general efficacy and safety. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2010) (explaining the
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tional research studies are not always persuasive when it comes to
66
making actual decisions for real patients. In contrast, CER inten67
tionally draws in a wider range of subjects.
Third, CER often evaluates customary treatments alongside new approaches, whereas traditional studies focus more heavily on new interventions alone. CER studies can thus provide critical information that
68
calls into question longstanding medical treatments or, alternatively,
that challenges the assumption that “what is newest” is usually “the
69
Although both can involve looking at existing treatments,
best.”
CER should not be confused with FDA postmarketing (or Phase IV)
70
studies. Phase IV studies typically look to safety and efficacy issues
with a single product, rather than comparing the effectiveness of dif71
ferent treatments as ordinarily involved in CER.

phases of an FDA investigation). However, the FDA typically does not analyze how
treatments compare to each other in terms of relative effectiveness. See Alec B.
O’Connor, Building Comparative Efficacy and Tolerability into the FDA Approval Process, 303
JAMA 979, 979-80 (2010) (arguing that the FDA should consider comparative effectiveness research in its approval decisions so that new but inferior treatments do not
replace established treatments); see also Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of
Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A Case Study of the FDA and Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 601-02 (2009) (discussing criteria the FDA typically considers during its approval process for medical devices).
66
See JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 4-5 (discussing how tightly controlled trials are
not always applicable to real-life scenarios); Bryan R. Luce et al., Rethinking Randomized
Clinical Trials for Comparative Effectiveness Research: The Need for Transformational Change,
151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 206, 208 (2009) (arguing that tightly controlled studies
“do not reach their potential value for health care decision making”).
67
CER “relaxes the strict exclusionary criteria that are typically required in [traditional] trials, in order to assess the treatment in the wide range of patients and environments in which the product is actually used.” JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 5
(emphasis added).
68
For example, a recent comparative study of resuscitation treatments found that
chest compression and breathing—the traditional resuscitation technique practiced
for many years—was generally no more effective than chest compression alone. See
Thomas D. Rea et al., CPR with Chest Compression Alone or with Rescue Breathing, 365 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 423, 432 (2010). Also, chest compression alone had better outcomes in
several patient subgroups. Both treatment interventions studied involved trained dispatchers assisting bystanders, who performed the procedures. Id.
69
JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 1.
70
For certain drugs, the FDA can condition its approval on the manufacturer
conducting additional Phase IV studies after the drug is marketed and adopted in clinical use. The aim of these postapproval studies is to gather more information about
the drug once it is used in broader populations and under different conditions than
the preapproval clinical trials. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2010) (detailing the FDA’s authority to require Phase IV studies).
71
See id. (explaining the goals of Phase IV studies); JACOBSON, supra note 36, at 5
(distinguishing between Phase IV and effectiveness studies); Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars
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E. Comparative Effectiveness Versus Cost-Effectiveness
What, ultimately, does it mean for one treatment to be more “effective” than another? In the political debates over health care
reform, opponents charged that CER would inherently involve some
form of cost-effectiveness review, resulting in coverage denial for expensive treatments and treatments for disabled patients and other
72
vulnerable groups. Even after the passage of PPACA, the degree to
which CER differs—if it should differ at all—from cost-effectiveness
analysis continues to create controversy. Cost-effectiveness analysis considers gains in health from a treatment compared to the expense of
offering the treatment (for example, years of life saved per dollar
73
spent). This contrasts with pure clinical-effectiveness analysis, which
looks solely to therapeutic outcomes of a treatment (for example, sur74
With CER, however, no clear consensus exists about
vival rates).
whether one should compare treatments based on their pure clinical
effectiveness, their cost-effectiveness, or some other metric.
PPACA seems to take a pure clinical-effectiveness approach. It
uses the key term “comparative clinical effectiveness research” and describes research that looks at “clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits,”
75
but nowhere does the statute mention comparing respective costs.
No doubt to make the legislation more politically palatable in light of
the concerns about CER and rationing, Congress avoided express discussion of cost comparisons. Indeed, “cost or value of health services
is conspicuously absent from the statutory definition of comparative
76
clinical effectiveness.” Yet rather than siding squarely against incorporating cost-effectiveness analysis into CER, lawmakers simply obfuscated, but did not preclude, the possibility. PPACA does not expressly

of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 488-89 (2010) (discussing postmarket study methodologies).
72
See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Opinion, ObamaCare Is All About Rationing, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 2009, at A15 (arguing that “rationing health care is central” to President Obama’s strategy to reduce health care costs); see also infra Section I.F.
73
See COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE xviii (Marthe Gold et al. eds.,
1996).
74
See, e.g., Adrian F. Hernandez et al., Clinical Effectiveness of Beta-Blockers in Heart
Failure, 53 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 184, 189 (2009) (studying the mortality rate in patients with heart failure who subsequently took beta-blockers).
75
PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010)
(emphasis added).
76
COAL. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, supra note 54, at 7.
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prohibit the research from encompassing cost comparisons, and
other parts of the statute imply that government-funded CER could
78
occasionally involve cost-effectiveness analysis. Indeed, key health
policy advisors in the Obama Administration say they hope that the
research will augment meaningful cost control for the health care system by identifying when the benefits of health care are not sufficient
79
to justify the costs.
The IOM’s recent report on national priorities for CER, required
80
by the Recovery Act, further illustrates the confusion about the government’s CER agenda and cost-effectiveness. The IOM lists one
81
hundred high-priority topics for CER studies. In many cases, the report discusses possible CER investigations solely in terms of clinicaleffectiveness comparisons. But in some instances, the IOM report
calls for comparing both the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of different interventions, such as in the discussion of research eva82
luating medical-management techniques for type 2 diabetes. It is not
always clear why the IOM report expressly mentions cost-effectiveness
for certain priority topics but not others. Congress did not repudiate
the IOM report’s approach in enacting PPACA, and the IOM report
will presumably continue to wield significant influence with regulators
in implementing the national CER program.
Incorporating regular cost-effectiveness review into a national CER
program has significant policy advantages. When considering whether
one treatment is “better” or “more effective” than another, therapeutic
and cost considerations become inextricably intertwined. Including
77

See id. (noting that PPACA’s comparative effectiveness provisions do not explicitly proscribe comparative cost-effectiveness research).
78
For example, the statute precludes the PCOR Institute from using “a dollarsper-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is
cost effective or recommended.” PPACA sec. 6301(c), § 1182(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e1(e) (emphasis added). Because the law singles out only this particular form of costeffectiveness analysis, it leaves open the possibility that other cost-effectiveness comparisons that do not adjust for quality of life in such a manner might be permissible as
part of government-funded CER.
79
See, e.g., Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 2, at 601-02 (identifying the CER initiatives, in the view of the former White House OMB Director and the OMB’s special
health policy advisor, as part of the important “cost control elements” of the new
health care reform legislation); Nussbaum et al., supra note 54, at 64-66 (noting that
Obama’s advisors view CER as a tool to pry savings out of the health care system).
80
See supra Section I.B.
81
See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 3 tbl.S-1 (noting the
areas of highest priority for CER studies).
82
See id. at 8 tbl.1.
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cost-effectiveness analysis as part of CER does not dictate that treatment decisions should be made solely or even significantly because of
cost. But it at least ensures that decisionmakers have a more accurate
83
understanding of the stakes in choosing between treatments.
However, physicians have generally been wary of a national CER
program featuring regular cost-effectiveness review. Many fear that
84
CER will facilitate crude cost-cutting. The uncertain boundaries
between CER and cost-effectiveness analysis intensify these concerns.
For example, the American Medical Association (AMA) explained to
its members that it had supported the Recovery Act’s CER provisions, which conspicuously avoided mentioning cost comparisons,
because such support was consistent with the AMA’s overall goal of
ensuring that “clinical considerations drive CER analysis” and that
“cost-effectiveness is subordinate to the consideration of safety and
85
clinical effectiveness.”
F. Limitations on Use of CER
To minimize concerns about rationing, Congress imposed significant limitations on the use of CER. PPACA restricts utilizing CER in
federal health care program reimbursement. The statute prohibits
the Secretary of Health and Human Services from making Medicare
86
coverage decisions “solely on the basis” of CER. It further provides
that if CER is used to inform a coverage decision, the Medicare program cannot use the evidence to assert that some treatments have less
effectiveness because they primarily help patients with an alleged low83

See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 19-20 (noting the challenges of
choosing a research option and how that affects treatment choices).
84
See, e.g., FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 57 (summarizing physician input from listening sessions and public-comment solicitations and noting the
concern that factoring cost into CER “could lead to limiting access and benefits . . . [or
be used for] looking for cheaper treatments”); Alvin I. Mushlin & Hassan Ghomrawi,
Health Care Reform and the Need for Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
e6(1), e6(1) (2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0912651 (“[T]here
are fears that patients will be denied effective care on the basis of CER’s findings.”).
85
AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 40, at 2 (emphasis added). However, not all physician groups oppose integrating cost-effectiveness analysis with CER. The American
College of Physicians has advocated that any national CER program should develop
cost-effectiveness information as well. See Am. Coll. of Physicians, Information on CostEffectiveness: An Essential Product of a National Comparative Effectiveness Program, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 956, 956 (2008) (calling for government-sponsored CER and
cost-effectiveness research).
86
PPACA sec. 6301(c), § 1182(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(b)(2) (West Supp.
1A 2010).
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87

er quality of life. Also, the Medicare program cannot use CER “in a
manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or termi88
nally ill individual as of lower value” than the needs of other patients.
Moreover, the statute essentially treats CER as mere advisory information by making clear that practice guidelines and coverage recommen89
dations need not incorporate findings from CER. These constraints
parallel and, in certain areas, expand upon earlier limitations imposed
90
upon use of CER under the Recovery Act and the Medicare Prescrip91
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.
These limitations make it difficult for governmental health care
programs to use CER in their financing decisions. For example, under
the current statutory criteria for Medicare reimbursement, services
generally qualify for payment so long as they are “reasonable and neces92
sary.” There is usually no need to demonstrate that a covered treat93
ment offers better clinical or cost-effectiveness than other treatments.
87

Id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(a).
Id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(c)(1). Similarly, PPACA
prohibits the PCOR Institute from “develop[ing] or employ[ing] a dollars-per-quality
adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an
individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or recommended” and imposes similar constraints on federal health programs. Id.
sec. 6301(c), § 1182(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(e).
89
See id. secs. 6301(a), 10602, § 1181(d)(8)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(d)(8)
(A)(iv) (requiring that the PCOR Institute ensure that research findings “do not include
practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, payment, or policy recommendations”).
90
See Recovery Act § 804(g)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8(g)(1) (West Supp. 1A 2010)
(stating that the law should not be interpreted to permit the Federal CER Council “to
mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies” for any health plan, public or
private). The Recovery Act also provided that the Federal CER Council’s recommendations were not to “be construed as mandates or clinical guidelines for payment, coverage, or treatment.” Id. § 804(g)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8(g)(2).
91
See Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1013(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2441 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(b)(2006)) (limiting the scope of changes that can be made based
on effectiveness research). The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 provided funds to the AHRQ to perform comparative clinical
effectiveness research on various items and services. Id. § 1013(e), 117 Stat. at 2441
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(e)). However, the statute also made clear
that the AHRQ Director should “not mandate national standards of clinical practice or
quality health care standards” and further required that the AHRQ Director provide
notice of this prohibition in any recommendations resulting from the funded research.
Id. § 1013(b).
92
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)–(B).
93
Under the “Least Costly Alternative” (LCA) policy, Medicare allowed its contractors, when making local coverage determinations, to limit the amount paid for
comparable treatment to the lower cost alternative and to not cover the excess payment for the more expensive intervention. For the most part, Medicare contractors
applied these rules to reimbursement for certain drugs and devices. See MEDICARE
88
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The Medicare program has tried to incorporate cost-effectiveness as an
additional criterion for coverage in the past, but the proposed rulemaking generated considerable controversy and has, for the most part,
94
been abandoned or limited. The availability of more CER information, to be used on a purely elective basis, is therefore unlikely to
change things materially. Other criteria in addition to CER must be
used to justify changes in Medicare coverage; otherwise the Medicare
program invites challenges that it has run afoul of PPACA by making
95
coverage decisions solely on the basis of CER. Coverage denials of
treatments that CER reveals have low effectiveness value can also be
challenged—depending on the clinical populations involved—for impermissibly discounting the value of such treatments for the elderly,
96
disabled, and terminally ill. Also, practice guidelines and coverage
97
recommendations need not pay special heed to CER. As a result, the
link between what CER reveals is comparatively effective and what
federal health care programs pay for will remain quite tenuous.
It is similarly uncertain whether CER will materially affect the
reimbursement practices of private health plans. The Medicare program traditionally has played a “first mover” role, with private payers

PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN
MEDICARE 6-7 (2010) (discussing the LCA and functional equivalence policies behind
Medicare’s reference pricing strategy). However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down Medicare’s attempts to use the LCA policy to limit reimbursement of
DuoNeb, an inhalation drug used in treatment of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. See Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The implications of the decision for the entire LCA policy are unclear, but apparently as a result of
the court ruling, Medicare has instructed its contractors to stop applying the LCA rules
when processing reimbursement for drugs covered under Medicare’s Part B (Medical
Insurance) program. See CMS Instructs Contractors to Rescind All LCA Provisions in Current
LCDs, HEALTH POL’Y WKLY. (AmerisourceBergen Specialty Grp., Wash., D.C.), Apr.
30, 2010, https://www.iononline.com/app/Documents/Health%20Policy%20Weekly/
2010/April%2030,%202010.pdf.
94
See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services
Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4308-09
(proposed Jan. 30, 1989) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405) (proposing costeffectiveness as a criterion). But see Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619, 22,620 (Apr. 27, 1999) (withdrawing
proposed rule). See generally Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, But Cannot, Consider Cost:
Legal Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2005) (arguing that
Congress must require Medicare to consider cost-effectiveness).
95
See PPACA sec. 6301(c), § 1182(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(b) (West Supp. 1A
2010) (prohibiting using CER as the only basis for denying coverage).
96
See id. sec. 6301(c), § 1182(c)–(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e-1(c)–(d).
97
See id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d)(8)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(8)(A) (prohibiting the inclusion of practice or coverage recommendations in the research findings).
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98

following Medicare reimbursement policies. If the Medicare program is statutorily hampered from incorporating CER more robustly
into reimbursement decisions, then there will be little innovation for
private health plans to follow. Moreover, Congress included express
language in the statute making clear that private health plans can regard CER as they see fit and have no obligation to change their policies
99
based on what the PCOR Institute thinks should be done. The statute
takes a hard line to ensure that CER plays only a limited, passive informational role, providing, for example, that the materials used to
disseminate CER “shall . . . not be construed as mandates, guidelines,
100
or recommendations for payment, coverage, or treatment.”
Other sections of PPACA, unrelated to the new national CER program, take cautious steps toward more innovative approaches to
health care financing. For example, the statute creates a new Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within the Centers for Medi101
care and Medicaid Services (CMS).
This entity will test new reimbursement methods that may help control costs “while preserving or
102
The new law also encourages experienhancing quality of care.”
mentation with global payments to hospital-physician groups for servic103
es bundled together around entire episodes of care. In addition, the
law creates the Independent Medicare Advisory Board, an independent
panel with limited authority to recommend spending reductions in the
104
Medicare program. But it is unclear whether the statutory restrictions
98

Paul N. Van de Water notes,

As the largest U.S. purchaser and regulator of health care, Medicare exerts a
major influence on the rest of the health care system. . . . Its reimbursement
and coverage policies have been widely adopted by private insurers and other
public programs. For example, many private insurers follow Medicare’s lead
in approving coverage of new medical technologies.
Paul N. Van de Water, Medicare Changes Can Complement Health Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, 3 ( July 31, 2008), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=
view&id=563.
99
PPACA states that its CER provisions are not to be construed “to permit the
[PCOR] Institute to mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies for any
public or private payer.” PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181( j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e( j) (emphasis added).
100
Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(a)(2)(B).
101
See id. § 3021(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(a).
102
Id.
103
See id. § 3023, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4.
104
See id. sec. 3403, § 1899A, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395kkk. The Independent Medicare
Advisory Board has authority to submit recommendations to reduce the per capita
growth rate of Medicare spending if spending exceeds a targeted growth rate. Id.
sec. 3403, § 1899A(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395kkk(b). But the Board cannot submit pro-

SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2170

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/11/2011 7:12 PM

[Vol. 159: 2147

on the use of CER would continue to apply to such demonstra105
tion/innovation initiatives.
Accordingly, the door has been opened
only partially to experimentation with CER and federal health care
reimbursement policy. In any event, these demonstration/innovation
initiatives will initially be limited in scope and take time to develop.
Plus, considerable doubt remains about whether these initiatives have
sufficient strength to take hold over the long term and lead to compre106
hensive change.
II. INFORMATION GAPS AND WHAT DRIVES MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING
This Article’s attention to CER’s probable translation problems is
not meant to be a critique of CER generally. Part of the reason for
disappointment about how the national CER program is taking shape
concerns the tremendous missed opportunities. The health care system critically needs effective CER. And the very reasons why—that

posals that will ration care, increase revenues, or change benefits. See id. sec. 3403,
§ 1899A(c)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) (“The proposal shall not include any recommendations to ration health care, raise revenue or Medicare beneficiary
premiums . . . .”); Robert A. Berenson, Implementing Health Care Reform—Why Medicare
Matters, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2010) (“The [Independent Medicare Advisory
B]oard’s role is carefully circumscribed . . . [and] it is expressly prohibited from recommending increasing revenues; changing benefits, including patient cost sharing; or altering program eligibility.”).
105
For example, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation might want to
test payment models in which coverage decisions are based solely on CER. To do so, it
would presumably need authority to ignore the statutory restriction on using CER in
this manner. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. PPACA does give the Secretary
of Health and Human Services authority to waive various Medicare and Medicaid statutory requirements in order to test innovative reimbursement models. See PPACA sec.
2001(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(gg). But in exercising this waiver authority, the Secretary
would need to expressly waive the CER limitation provisions. Given how controversies
over linking CER to reimbursement led to such statutory restrictions in the first place,
it is not clear that the Secretary would want to take the politically unpalatable step of
reopening such debates by waiving the CER limitation provisions.
106
See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 104, at 102-03 (casting doubt on whether enough
physicians will participate in the bundled payment initiatives with hospitals and describing how the Independent Medicare Advisory Board’s impact will likely be limited); David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Everything Else,
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 370, 381 (2010) (observing that the Board has limited authority to
make fast-track recommendations about physician payments and questioning whether
the Board will be able to make significant cost-cutting recommendations without creating a crippling political backlash); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 104-05 (2010) (noting that the Board will most
likely focus on cuts to Medicare Advantage plans in the early years, not significant
changes in physician reimbursement, and also observing that “[m]any questions remain about how, and indeed whether, the [Board] will work”).
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solid effectiveness evidence currently plays only a limited role in medical decisionmaking and that many nonclinical factors influence the
choice of treatment—underscore the difficulties in engaging physicians to better utilize CER.
Because of medicine’s hallowed scientific traditions, the common
misconception is that scientific evidence supports customary practices
and that physicians can consistently identify right and wrong treatments for most conditions. In reality, uncertainty pervades medi107
cine.
Thus, the much repeated story of advice given to a medical
school graduating class: “[H]alf of what we teach you here is wrong—
108
unfortunately, we don’t know which half.”
Achieving consensus among physicians on a best treatment is often difficult. For a particular illness, many possible care pathways may
exist, and even the same treatment can present different benefits and
harms for otherwise similar patients due to patient-specific responses
109
and genetic differences.
Furthermore, nonclinical factors, such as
reimbursement incentives, heavily influence physician decision110
making. As a result, the concept of “standard of care” varies significantly, and the lack of good comparative effectiveness data further
fragments customary standards. Studies suggest that when evidence
about comparative effectiveness is weak, treatment variations tend to
111
be greater between physicians.
Another common misconception concerns the degree of evidence
needed for a treatment to become established as custom. Many
treatments diffuse into practice without testing through randomized
clinical trials or other rigorous evaluations. New surgical and diagnostic procedures generally do not require the approval of the FDA or
other regulatory agencies before they are introduced into regular clin107

See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 117 (noting the
existence of “significant evidence gaps” in medicine and the “[u]ncertainty about clinical effectiveness applies to new and old services”).
108
Lisa Sanders, Medicine’s Progress, One Setback at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003,
at SM29; see also Jerome Groopman & Pamela Hartzband, Op-Ed., Why “Quality” Care Is
Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009, at A13 (attributing a similar quotation to Dr. David
Sackett, “a pioneer of [the] ‘evidence-based medicine’” movement).
109
See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753, 753-55 (2006) (outlining the regulatory issues
raised by the genetic variability of drug response).
110
See infra notes 125-134 and accompanying text.
111
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 1 (“[T]he extent of the variation in
treatments may be greatest when evidence about their relative effectiveness is lacking.”); McClellan & Benner, supra note 29, at 10 (suggesting an absence of CER findings is “partly to blame” for greater geographic variation in treatment patterns).
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112

ical practice.
The FDA approval process for drugs and devices,
meanwhile, yields only limited information concerning comparative
effectiveness. For new drugs, clinical trial testing typically focuses on
satisfying the FDA approval criteria of safety and general effectiveness,
113
not relative effectiveness. Indeed, because of the limited information
generated, commentators have called for new labeling rules that would
advise physicians and patients that although the FDA may have approved a new drug, no evidence exists that it actually works better than
114
other medications. The FDA approval process for devices yields even
115
more limited data about a product’s relative value.
Clinical practice guidelines serve as another potential source of effectiveness information. However, many existing guidelines suffer
from potential bias, advancing the narrow interests of specialty physi116
cian groups, drug companies, and other interested parties.
More
problematically, clinical practice guidelines often lack a firm foundation of comparative effectiveness evidence. Rather than synthesizing
hard data such as information generated from randomized clinical
trials, many practice guidelines are more like consensus statements of
117
professional opinion.

112

See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 447 (2002).
113
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing the FDA new drug approval process).
114
See Randall S. Stafford et al., New, But Not Improved? Incorporating ComparativeEffectiveness Information into FDA Labeling, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1230, 1232 (2009) (“In
the absence of comparative data, drug and device labels should include a statement
indicating that there is no evidence of the product’s superiority to other products.”).
115
The FDA device-approval process typically gathers safety and effectiveness information only for high-risk devices and produces very little data about relative effectiveness. See Hearing on Strategies to Increase Information on Comparative Clinical Effectiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th
Cong. 57 (2007) (statement of Mark Miller, Executive Director, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission) (commenting that the FDA approval process does not generate
comparative effectiveness evidence); see also O’Connor, supra note 65, at 979 (“The
current FDA standards for approval fail to assess whether newly approved drugs and
devices are less efficacious or less well-tolerated than existing alternatives.”).
116
See Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines—The Warped Incentives in the US
Healthcare System 32-36 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
No. 181, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593133 (identifying flaws in the
creation of practice guidelines).
117
See, e.g., Pierluigi Tricoci et al., Scientific Evidence Underlying the ACC/AHA Clinical Practice Guidelines, 301 JAMA 831, 833-35 (2009) (finding that the American College
of Cardiology and American Heart Association clinical practice guidelines show “consistent gaps in evidence about medical practices”).
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Also, medical knowledge constantly changes as new treatments
and technologies come down the pike. It becomes quite challenging
to perform adequate and still relevant assessments with so many mov118
ing targets. Another reason for information deficits concerning relative effectiveness is that public financing of CER in the United States
has traditionally been limited, in contrast to other countries with
119
more robust public CER programs.
Without the support of reliable comparative effectiveness informa120
tion, suboptimal medical decisionmaking can result.
Even when
physicians make treatment choices with the best intentions, informational deficits regarding relative effectiveness can lead to the selection
121
of ineffective or even inappropriate care.
Even worse, and perhaps counterintuitively, it is not easy to remedy the information gap simply by producing more and better evidence. In several instances, physicians did not change practice patterns even after widely disseminated studies suggested that they were
122
choosing inferior treatments.
The common pattern is that “physi118

As the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has observed, new
treatments often “disseminate quickly into routine medical care with little or no basis
for knowing whether they outperform existing treatments, and to what extent.” MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 33, at 107.
119
The United Kingdom’s National Health Service has perhaps the most wellknown, and controversial, public CER program. The U.K. National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) provides comprehensive technology assessment. See Pearson, supra note 38, at 77 box A (describing the structure, function, and
methods of NICE). NICE reviews, which include cost-effectiveness analysis, heavily influence the treatments that the National Health Service covers. Id.
120
See Michael S. Lauer & Francis S. Collins, Using Science to Improve the Nation’s
Health System, 303 JAMA 2182, 2182 (2010) (noting that, “[t]o the surprise of many,”
drugs meant to treat cardiac arrhythmia led to increased rates of arrhythmic death).
121
See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (“When specific evidence
is lacking, clinicians have to rely on their clinical experience . . . [and] these decisions
can result in less than optimal, and sometimes inappropriate, treatment choices.”).
When solid comparative effectiveness evidence is lacking, less reliable information is
left to fill the void. “Unfortunately, the individual physician may be most impressed by
observations made in his or her individual practice. This source of evidence is notoriously vulnerable to bias and error.” David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice:
The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., May 1984, at 74, 81.
122
For example, in 2007, the New England Journal of Medicine published the
“COURAGE” (Clinical Outcomes Utilizing Revascularization and Aggressive Drug
Evaluation) study. William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy With or Without PCI
for Stable Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503 (2007). The research concluded
that heart surgery using stents to unclog blocked arteries, a common procedure, often
was not more effective than simply treating the cardiac patients with drugs alone or
trying drug treatment first and moving to stents only if complications remained. Id. at
1509-11. Many expected the research’s publication would lead to significantly de-
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cians, hospitals, and patients are slow to respond to new evidence of
123
ineffectiveness.”
Even information dissemination about safety concerns can have weak influence on physician decisionmaking. For example, physicians have been known to pay little heed to the dire
“black box” warnings that the FDA uses to alert physicians about newly
124
discovered dangers associated with certain drugs.
Information dissemination has a modest impact at best because
physicians receive and adopt the information in somewhat haphazard
125
and idiosyncratic ways.
Many other factors drive community physicians’ decisionmaking apart from the underlying comparative effec126
tiveness data. The way physicians are paid is a key influence. Financial incentives powerfully guide physician behavior by engaging and
exploiting the individual’s economic self-interest, above and beyond
127
A physician’s initial profestechnical appeals to clinical judgment.
sional education also has long-lasting impact, as physicians may exhibit path dependence, adhering to treatment pathways and decision
approaches learned during their medical school and residency train128
Also, the views of respected local physician opinion
ing programs.
creased use of stents, but after a brief decline in use of the procedure, stent implants
began to increase again. See Keith J. Winstein, A Simple Health-Care Fix Fizzles Out, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010, at A1 (noting that stent implants “are now back at peak levels” and
that such studies “have rarely altered medical practice”). Part of the resistance to
change may be because physicians and hospitals receive more favorable reimbursement
for performing stent implants than for initiating drug therapy alone. Also, a degree of
path dependence makes physicians resistant to switching from previous practices.
123
Thom Wilder, Despite Doubts About CER’s Impact, Studies Should Take Place, Researcher Says, 9 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 215-16 (Apr. 7, 2010).
124
See Jerry H. Gurwitz, Editorial, Serious Adverse Drug Effects—Seeing the Trees
Through the Forest, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1414 (2006).
125
See Noah, supra note 112, at 377 (“[W]e most certainly do not yet enjoy fully
evidence-based medical practice.”).
126
See Hyman, supra note 106, at 371-72 (“It is difficult to overstate the extent to
which economic incentives explain the structure, performance, and pathologies of the
American health care system.”).
127
See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a
Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1746-47 (1987).
128
See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein et al., The Effects of Physicians’ Training and Personality
on Test Ordering for Ambulatory Patients, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1271, 1272 & tbl.1 (1984)
(finding that physicians trained in medical schools with more academic focuses tended
to order more tests than other physicians); Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 76-77 (2008) (observing that physicians’ willingness to disregard evidence-based sources of information partly stems from their experiences as
trainees in the hierarchical environment of residency training programs, “where the
opinion of the attending physician is revered as authoritative” and, accordingly, crowds
out other information sources).
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leaders and the recommendations of physician peers can heavily sway
129
community doctors’ treatment choices.
Aggressive marketing by
drug and device manufactures can also impact physicians’ treatment
130
selection. Other influencing factors include physicians’ malpractice
131
risk perceptions, the demands of patients and payers for certain
132
products and services, physicians’ enthusiastic belief in new tech133
nology, and physicians’ intuition and judgment based on isolated
134
clinical experiences.
III. TRANSLATION BARRIERS
While the health care system critically needs high-quality CER,
many factors limit the ability to make productive use of the research.
Some complications arise from the inherent cost and difficulty of developing high-quality research. Perhaps even more importantly, even
with very good CER available, physicians will be hesitant to change or
adapt their practice patterns. As already noted, some physicians view
CER with deep suspicion as a vehicle for rationing expensive treat-

129

See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 128, at 76 (“Studies document significant influence of peer opinions on clinical decision making . . . .”); Stephen B. Soumerai et al.,
Effect of Local Medical Opinion Leaders on Quality of Care for Acute Myocardial Infarction: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 279 JAMA 1358, 1362-63 (1998) (“[W]hen best practices
are clearly defined . . . local opinion leaders can accelerate adoption of effective treatments . . . .”); Jane M. Young et al., Role for Opinion Leaders in Promoting Evidence-Based
Surgery, 138 ARCHIVES SURGERY 785, 789-91 (2003) (finding that most surgeons believe
opinion leaders influence surgical practice).
130
See DOCTEUR & BERENSON, supra note 37, at 3 (arguing that standard medical
practice reflects such marketing, among other considerations, rather than medical
evidence).
131
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299
JAMA 2789, 2790 (2008) (“Medical malpractice laws and the resultant defensive medicine also contribute to overutilization [of health care].”).
132
See id. at 2790-91 (attributing part of the overutilization of health care to directto-consumer marketing); Wilder, supra note 123, at 216 (discussing how health care
providers were slow to abandon use of high-dose chemotherapy followed by autologous
bone marrow transplants for breast cancer despite mounting evidence of the treatment’s ineffectiveness, due in part to patient demand).
133
See infra Section III.E (discussing how the “technological imperative” can lead
to the premature adoption of medical procedures and technology); see also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7, at 4 (listing “enthusiasm for the newest technology” as
one of the reasons for the spread of new medical technologies despite a lack of proof
of their effectiveness).
134
See Alain Enthoven, What Medical Care Is and Isn’t, in CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET
AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 135, 135-36 (2d ed. 1998) (excerpting A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COSTS OF
HEALTH CARE 1-9 (1980)).
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135

ments.
Professional self-interest as well as legitimate therapeutic
concerns for patients provide additional reasons for physician resistance. Current legal rules and policy approaches fail to provide sufficient incentives for incorporating CER into regular clinical practice
and may even discourage physicians from doing so.
A. Vagueness and Mission Creep
The failure to provide a more precise, consistent legislative and
136
regulatory definition for CER creates vagueness concerns, increasing the risk of fragmented work that lacks common methods and
priorities. The confusion over whether CER should include thorough
137
A comprehensive review
cost-effectiveness analysis is one example.
of CER drug studies appearing in medical journals to date found that
the investigations often did not consider cost (or safety, for that mat138
ter), making the research arguably incomplete and raising concerns
139
Ideally, the new national CER program would
of publication bias.
require that government-funded studies use uniform methodologies
to facilitate data sharing and improve the quality of the research. Un140
fortunately, the ambiguous legislative and regulatory guidance so far
leaves things unclear by not precluding the possibility that CER could
include cost comparisons, but also by not providing consistent, forceful direction as to appropriate methodologies or even when such cost
comparisons should be included.
Related to vagueness issues are “mission-creep” concerns. Physicians can be expected to question the new national CER program as
unfocused and overly broad, extending to investigations that do not
directly advance the originally understood goals of CER. The con141
gressionally mandated IOM report exemplifies these problems. The

135

See supra Section I.E.
See supra Section I.D.
137
See supra Section I.E.
138
See generally Michael Hochman & Danny McCormick, Characteristics of Published
Comparative Effectiveness Studies of Medications, 303 JAMA 951 (2010).
139
Publication bias describes the greater likelihood that studies showing a significant positive result will receive publication opportunities (or are published at all) than
equally well-conducted studies that report a negative result. This can lead to a discounting of costs and risks and an overrating of published treatments. See generally
Lakshmi Sridharan & Philip Greenland, Editorial, Editorial Policies and Publication Bias:
The Importance of Negative Studies, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1022 (2009).
140
See supra Section I.E.
141
See supra Section I.B.
136
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IOM identified one hundred high-priority topics for CER.
Rather
than head-to-head treatment comparisons, about half of the recommendations concern general health care delivery-system issues, such as
evaluating different strategies to delineate barriers to care, especially for
143
members of populations that experience health disparities. Such research, although worthy on its own terms, seems a bit far afield from
helping physicians choose between specific treatment options, suppo144
sedly one of the main purposes of the new national CER program.
The inclusion of research that gets beyond head-to-head treatment
comparisons will no doubt disappoint physicians wanting information
145
more immediately relevant to their clinical circumstances.
In part, the new CER agenda may appear overly broad, and seemingly untethered, because of the historic opportunities created by the
record governmental funding. With so much money at stake, it should
not surprise that diverse interest groups have clamored and lobbied
heavily for some share of the new CER funds. When the IOM elicited
input from stakeholders on national priorities for CER, as required under the Recovery Act, it received over 2600 nominations from more
146
than 1700 respondents within three weeks. But the more diffuse the
CER research agenda becomes, and the more it covers general health
policy matters, the less likely that the information generated will command the attention of physicians practicing in the clinical trenches.
B. Costly Studies That Raise More Questions Than Answers
Another set of complications concerns the significant cost of conducting CER and the uncertain persuasiveness of the data generated.
142

See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 3 tbl.S-1.
See id.
144
According to the Federal CER Council, “The purpose of [CER] is to provide information that helps clinicians and patients choose which option best fits an individual
patient’s needs and preferences.” FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
145
As Mark Miller, Executive Director of MedPAC, explained, “we expected to see
a lot more drug-drug, device-device, medical treatment versus surgical” comparisons as
recommended research priorities. Mark Miller, Remarks at the Public Meeting of the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 107 (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Remarks at
MedPAC Meeting], available at http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/0909MedPAC.pdf.
MedPAC Commissioner Dr. Thomas Dean expressed his surprise “at how vague or
kind of non-focused some of the [IOM’s priority] recommendations were,” as well as
his disappointment with the lack of specifics. Thomas Dean, Remarks at MedPAC
Meeting, supra, at 109. He further opined, “At least from a clinical point of view, that’s
what we would need to make clinical decisions. From a policy point of view, maybe
some of the other broader things.” Id.
146
Sox & Greenfield, supra note 11, at 203.
143
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1. Cost
The gold standard in medical research—the type of investigation
most likely to produce data compelling to the larger medical communi147
ty—remains the randomized controlled trial (RCT).
RCTs are already expensive and time-consuming to conduct for general-efficacy
148
trials. A core feature of CER, however, is the inclusion of distinct pa149
tient subgroups to reflect real world circumstances.
To achieve this
broader focus, comparative effectiveness RCTs will often need to involve more subjects than general-efficacy RCTs, adding to the cost and
time required to complete the investigations. Also, to draw conclusions
about the value of different treatments relative to each other, CER will
likely need to detect small differences in outcomes. These differences
may only become statistically significant when observed in a sufficiently
large group of subjects. This increases the need to involve larger sam150
ple populations, making the studies even more expensive to conduct.
2. Secondary Data, Less Rigorous Research Methodologies,
and Varying Measures of Effectiveness
Ironically, the CER movement may be a victim of its own success
in calling attention to the flimsy foundation of scientific information
underlying many current medical practices. The new push for CER
has presumably heightened physician interest in better evidence. Yet
this raises the question: why should physicians trust that CER is sufficiently “better evidence”?
Indeed, CER studies often cannot be designed with a high degree
of scientific rigor. For example, switching some subjects from customary treatments may be seen as inappropriate before the comparative
evidence becomes available. Also, it may not be possible to draw sufficiently large study populations from different patient subgroups. Ac147

See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 211 (2d
ed. 1986) (“[T]he RCT is the gold standard . . . .”); Noah, supra note 112, at 381 (listing
RCTs as the preferred study model when health professionals are “faced with a clinical
problem”). In an RCT, subjects are randomly assigned to receive one of several clinical
interventions. The possible interventions include the standard of comparison or control.
The control may be the leading customary treatment, a placebo, or no treatment at all.
Study Design, DUKE UNIV. MED. CTR. ONLINE, http://www.mclibrary.duke.edu/subject/
ebm/studies.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
148
See generally Analysis of Comparative Effectiveness, RAND HEALTH COMPARE,
http://www.randcompare.org/analysis-of-options/analysis-of-comparative-effectiveness
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
149
See supra Section I.D.
150
See Luce et al., supra note 66, at 208.
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cordingly, for many treatment comparisons, the traditional standards
for RCTs will need to be loosened; this could mean allocating subjects
unequally between different arms of a study or incorporating information from observational studies and other secondary data sources into
151
the base evidence for the RCTs. Adjustments in this manner create
more flexibility but also invite physician concern about the persua152
siveness of the data.
Some CER studies will not utilize RCTs at all, but rather will rely instead on secondary research, such as meta-analysis, systematic reviews of
existing literature, observational studies, medical registries review, and
153
analysis of existing claims and medical records.
But physicians have
traditionally viewed such secondary research methodologies as less
154
Also,
convincing than, and inferior to, carefully structured RCTs.
because CER involves more diverse groups of patients than traditional
efficacy investigations, it raises “the analytical challenges of making
155
crisp inferences” from base data sets that will be noisier and messier,
making it harder to isolate which interventions produced which therapeutic outcomes. This likely will require more frequent use of newer statistical techniques, such as adaptive strategies that change endpoints midstream through a study or that include new treatments for
156
Yet comcomparison while some data has already been accrued.
munity practitioners have less familiarity and comfort with these research methods.
Physicians can also legitimately question the basic effectiveness
criteria chosen for comparative study. The seemingly simple question,
“Is treatment A more effective than treatment B?” is really not so simple. Even if one excludes cost-effectiveness from the definition of
157
CER, considerable uncertainty remains about how to measure treatments against each other. With chronic cancer care, for example, one
treatment may offer longer term survival rates or better objective measures, such as tumor shrinkage, but may have less tolerable medication
151

See id. (discussing implementation of “adaptive” RCTs).
The goal of making CER pragmatic and quickly responsive to clinicians may
conflict at times with the concurrent goal of generating hard scientific data. See Eugene C. Rich, The Policy Debate over Public Investment in Comparative Effectiveness Research,
24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 752, 752-53 (2009).
153
Id. at 752-53.
154
See Luce et al., supra note 66, at 206 (“[RCTs] are the most rigorous method of
generating comparative effectiveness evidence . . . .”).
155
Sox & Greenfield, supra note 11, at 205.
156
See Luce et al., supra note 66.
157
See supra Section I.E.
152
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side effects or may fare worse in controlling other debilitating symp158
toms of the underlying cancer. Without greater consensus on what is
to be specifically compared in effectiveness studies, individual physicians will regard some CER data as incomplete and unconvincing.
3. Accounting for Individual Patient Differences
Some physicians remain indifferent to or unpersuaded by CER
because they doubt whether the research adequately captures each
patient’s individual circumstances. High-quality CER supposedly accounts for the experiences and treatment responses of different subgroups of patients, making the research more context specific to par159
ticular individuals, not just the average patient. PPACA attempts to
advance such work by requiring that governmentally funded CER take
into account potential effectiveness differences when treatments are
used “with various subpopulations, such as racial and ethnic minorities, women, age, and groups of individuals with different comorbidi160
ties, [or] genetic and molecular sub-types.”
But at the end of the day, CER studies can be individually tailored
only so much. Translating the studies into clinical practice will require generalizing the experience of some subgroup of patients to the
individual patient at hand where inevitable differences in age, gender,
health status, medication history, genetics, and other factors still exist.
Moreover, in looking primarily at the relative clinical effectiveness of
different treatments, CER may not adequately account for other factors that physicians regard as important to their individual patients’
medical decisions, such as quality of life, the actual burdens imposed
161
by the treatment, and the treatment’s cost. No matter how rigorous
the research methodologies used to address patient subgroup differences, physicians may rightly be concerned that a particular CER
study did not include subjects truly representative of their own patients, especially because treatment responses can be highly patient

158

Nancy Berlinger & Anne Lederman Flamm, Define “Effective”: The Curious Case
of Chronic Cancer, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 17, 18.
159
See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 6 (calling for CER to account for groups “traditionally under-represented in medical research,” such as minorities, children, and those with multiple chronic conditions).
160
PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2)(D) (West
Supp. 1A 2010). The law further requires that CER investigations “include members of
such subpopulations as subjects in the research as feasible and appropriate.” Id.
161
Research Should Be Patient-Focused, Comparative Effectiveness Council Told, 3 Life Sci.
L. & Indus. Rep. (BNA) 657 (2009).
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specific. As Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
Commissioner Dr. Thomas Dean has observed,
We’re never going to have perfect data. There’s always going to be patients who have unique situations, and we have to make sure that our policies allow for that, and that if we make good clinical decisions that don’t
162
entirely follow [the CER results], there has to be allowance for that.

4. Accounting for Individual Provider Differences
The flip side of whether CER adequately captures the varying circumstances of each patient is whether it sufficiently accounts for the
distinctions between health care providers. This is especially important because CER aims to improve the existing evidence base in part
by rigorously evaluating surgical procedures and other treatments not
ordinarily subject to regulatory review by the FDA in its oversight of
163
drugs, devices, and biologics. Provider differences can have a significant influence on the effectiveness of such interventions. Physicians
offering the exact same surgical procedure to very similar patients, for
example, may still vary considerably in treatment outcomes due to
164
physicians’ different experiences and skills.
The recent Randomized On/Off Bypass (ROOBY) trial sponsored
165
by the Department of Veterans Affairs serves as a cautionary example of how provider differences can weaken the persuasiveness of CER
investigations. Researchers designed the ROOBY trial to test the
comparative effectiveness of “off-pump” bypass surgery for cardiac pa166
Traditional bypass surgery involves using a heart-lung matients.
chine, or “pump,” to circulate blood for the patient while physicians
167
stop the heart to perform the surgical connections. The newer offpump technique avoids use of the machine, and allows surgeons to

162

Dean, supra note 145, at 111-12.
See supra Part II.
164
PPACA recognizes this by providing that funded research “be designed, as appropriate, to take into account different characteristics of treatment modalities,” such
as “the impact of the skill of the operator of the treatment modality.” PPACA
sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d)(2)(E). Despite such efforts, it
remains to be seen whether the research can be designed to overcome physician concerns about this variable.
165
See generally A. Laurie Shroyer et al., On-Pump Versus Off-Pump Coronary-Artery Bypass Surgery, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827 (2009).
166
Id. at 1828.
167
Gina Kolata, Older Bypass Method Is Best, A Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009,
at A20.
163
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168

operate while the heart still beats.
The interest in off-pump surgeries developed in part because of concerns that patients even temporarily dependent on the heart-lung machine were at higher risk of developing neuropsychological problems, strokes, and other
complications postsurgery—perhaps due to the way in which the
169
Off-pump surgery atpump oxygenates and circulates the blood.
tracted considerable interest in the past decade, with surgeons per170
forming an estimated twenty percent of bypasses off-pump.
Yet the ROOBY trial produced surprising results that called into
question the enthusiasm for off-pump surgery. Researchers saw no
difference in neuropsychological outcomes between the on-pump and
off-pump patient groups, directly challenging the supposed advantag171
es of off-pump surgery.
Moreover, the investigation found that the
off-pump patients had worse therapeutic outcomes overall, requiring
more repeat surgeries and also having higher complication rates after
172
one year.
In some respects, the ROOBY trial worked just as optimal CER
should. It provided rigorous scientific evidence for physicians to reconsider their medical choices and challenged physicians’ often uncritical enthusiasm for technological innovation, demonstrating that newer is not always better. The results, published in the prestigious New
England Journal of Medicine, made big news in the medical community.
In the words of Dr. Eric Peterson, an academic cardiologist at Duke
173
174
who wrote an editorial accompanying the study, “This is a big one.”
Meanwhile, Dr. Michael Lauer, director of cardiovascular sciences at
the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, said that he hoped the
175
ROOBY trial would lead to a decline in off-pump surgeries.
Yet anecdotal reports suggest that a good number of physicians
have not been convinced to change their surgical approaches. For
example, Dr. Nirav Patel, a cardiac specialist at New York’s Lenox Hill
Hospital, told the New York Times that he would not alter his practice,
which involves an estimated ninety-five percent of his patients receiv168

Id.
Id.
170
Id.
171
See Shroyer et al., supra note 165, at 1827.
172
Id. at 1828-29. The researchers “hypothesized that there would be no difference between the . . . procedures . . . .” Id. at 1828.
173
See Eric David Peterson, Innovation and Comparative-Effectiveness Research in Cardiac Surgery, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1897 (2009).
174
Kolata, supra note 167.
175
Id.
169
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176

ing off-pump surgery.
Dr. Patel said that he had performed more
than 1400 off-pump surgeries, likely more than many of the physicians
studied in the ROOBY trial, and he thought that his skills had im177
Letproved significantly due to the increase in procedure volume.
ters to the editor following the study’s medical journal publication similarly warned about the confounding complications posed by
178
The quite
physician skill differences and relative experience rates.
bumpy road experienced by the ROOBY trial illustrates the considerable difficulties that arise in translating CER into clinical practice.
5. Keeping Pace with Innovation
Some physicians discount CER because of concerns that it cannot
keep pace with the rapid speed of medical innovation and shifting
views of clinicians. As previously noted, many CER studies will take a
long time to complete because the research aims to include a broader
179
range of patient subgroups as subjects, while other CER investigations will be based on secondary review of existing data arising from
180
As such, a time lag occurs between the
already completed studies.
data collection and the research study’s public dissemination. During
this interval, what clinicians view as the best competing treatment alternatives may change and, moreover, entirely new treatment approaches may develop. For example, oncologist Leonard Zwelling argues, “Since CER uses analyses of older, previously completed studies
or collections of clinical data from disparate hospital records, CER is
unlikely to help the individual with a newly diagnosed cancer in 2010.

176

Id.
Id.
178
See, e.g., John D. Puskas et al., Letter to the Editor, On-Pump Versus Off-Pump
CABG, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 851, 851 (2010) (“It is illogical to conduct a randomized
trial comparing patient outcomes with alternative surgical techniques among surgical
operators who have grossly asymmetric experience and expertise with the two procedures being compared. This is the ‘fatal flaw’ of the ROOBY trial.”). On-pump surgeons in the trial were somewhat more likely to have been residents instead of attending
physicians. See Shroyer et al., supra note 165, at 1836. Also, the off-pump surgeons
might have lacked sufficient experience with that procedure to represent its advantages fairly, while the level of expertise of the cardiac anesthesiologist, another relevant
factor in surgical success, was not reported. See Peterson, supra note 173, at 1898.
179
See supra Section III.B.3.
180
See Leonard A. Zwelling, Op-Ed., “Comparative Effectiveness” Research is Always
Behind the Curve, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2010, at A23 (arguing that CER cannot keep
pace with advances in medicine as it relies on “old data” in a misguided attempt to
standardize therapy and reduce costs).
177
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That patient may choose among therapeutic options that were unavail181
able even a few years ago.”
Also, the effectiveness of a treatment studied as part of a CER investigation may change over time as physicians develop expert skill in
administering it, or as better understanding evolves of how patients’
genetic differences interact with the underlying disease and the proposed treatment. Accordingly, physicians may view some CER studies
182
as stale on arrival.
6. Uncertain Answers
At bottom, CER may not be compelling to some physicians because it often fails to give sufficiently definitive answers. For example,
comparison of drug versus surgical treatment for the same illness may
reveal that the surgical procedure is more risky in terms of complications and post-treatment morbidity but that it also produces longer
lasting improvements among patients who do experience a therapeu183
tic benefit. Physicians may be left wondering what to make of such
data in terms of deciding treatment for the patient at hand. Although
CER promises to include broader, more representative study populations, it is difficult to capture these multiple considerations consistently in each investigation. As a result, inherent degrees of uncertainty
will always remain even after the results of CER studies roll in. Thus,
the research may prove more frustrating than reassuring, as “it often
fails to show which treatment is best, and for whom. . . . Instead of giv184
ing definitive answers, it opens the door to new questions . . . .”
Some physicians can be expected to act conservatively in the face of
this uncertainty and call for even more data before they are willing to
change longstanding practice patterns.
C. Financial Incentives
Health care financing also increases the risk of physician tune-out
because current payment rules fail to reward physicians for adopting
181

Id.
See McClellan & Benner, supra note 29, at 9 (“[S]ome critics argue that CER
results are likely to be misused, and the evidence may be outdated by the time it is
available.”).
183
See Susan Gilbert, The Nesting-Egg Problem: Why Comparative Effectiveness Research
Is Trickier Than It Looks, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 11, 11-12 (discussing
the tendency of CER to “open[] the door to new questions” rather than to give “definitive answers”).
184
Id.
182

SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Health Care Reform’s Wild Card

6/11/2011 7:12 PM

2185

CER into clinical practice. As noted earlier, Medicare reimburses
physician services so long as they meet the statutory “reasonable and
185
And under Medicare’s physician fee
necessary” coverage criteria.
schedule, the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), physicians generally receive higher payments for services that are consi186
dered more intense and that require more physician work effort.
Thus, Medicare payments to physicians do not generally depend on
whether the physician chose a more clinically effective (or, for that
matter, cost-effective) treatment. Moreover, because of the way in
which the various financial incentives misalign to encourage the performance of more complex services and more services overall, the
current Medicare rules can inadvertently reward physicians for offer187
ing treatments less effective than their alternatives.
The Medicare approach reflects larger reimbursement trends.
PPACA leaves private payers considerable discretion to ignore CER re188
sults in setting reimbursement policy. In fact, few payers, public or
private, apply reimbursement rules that reward physicians for choosing treatments based on comparative effectiveness. Most payment sys189
Physician reimbursetems generally remain “quality insensitive.”
ment continues to be, for the most part, fee-for-service, under which
physicians can generate payment for each discrete reimbursable service they provide, notwithstanding the outcome. Also, most health
185

42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006); see also supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
186
Under Medicare’s RBRVS fee schedule, physicians receive higher payments for
services that are considered to require greater skill and time to perform. At bottom, it
remains a fee-for-service system, with physicians generally paid based on the reimbursable services that they provide, not on the quality of the outcome. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-4 (setting out the rules of payment for physicians’ services); Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1189, 1201-02 (2009) (characterizing RBRVS ratemaking as “a politicized . . . process”
that results in fees that “have sent distorted economic signals to the market”).
187
This effect is due to the fact that the RBRVS fee schedule, and the fee-forservice payment system generally, are ordinarily insensitive to the quality of the treatment outcome. For example, “[s]ervices that contribute greatly to high-quality care
that are labor- or time-intensive and rely less on technical resources, such as patient
education in self-management of chronic conditions and care coordination, tend to be
undervalued and are not adequately reflected in current payment arrangements.”
INST OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE 4 (2007).
188
See supra Section I.F.
189
Hyman, supra note 106, at 372; see also McClellan & Benner, supra note 29, at 13
(“[T]he current fee-for-service reimbursement environment provides limited incentives at best to use effective treatments that cost less: virtually all of the treatments, big
and small, that vary substantially from area to area receive higher payments when they
are used more often, not necessarily when they contribute to better outcomes.”).
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plans make coverage decisions with little regard for comparative effectiveness, so physicians can continue to recommend treatments that do
190
not work as well as available alternatives.
D. Bias and Public/Private Oversight
Suspicions of bias also lead some physicians to question the integrity of the national CER program. As previously noted, in a move that
awarded significant authority to private groups, PPACA abolished the
previous federal-commission-type oversight structure for CER (the
191
Federal CER Council) and replaced it with the PCOR Institute. The
PCOR Institute will award publicly funded research contracts, identify
national priorities for CER investigations, and set the agenda for and
192
Yet it is not an agency, governdirect the nation’s CER program.
mental unit, or otherwise purely public entity. To be incorporated as
a new nonprofit corporation, the PCOR Institute will have a mix of
public and private representation on its governing board, with private
193
members in the majority. Also, three members must represent drug
and device manufacturers, and three other members must represent
194
private payers. The initial board of governors, which the Comptroller General selects, includes officials from powerful drug and device
firms Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, and Pfizer, and representatives
195
from influential payers BlueCross BlueShield and Xerox.
Taken in its most favorable light, the PCOR Institute is consistent
with the “new governance” theory that favors multistakeholder decisionmaking, various degrees of agency delegation and mediated selfregulation, and enlistment of private expertise and resources to ad196
dress complex public problems. Also, health care regulation already
190

See Pearson, supra note 38, at 72 (“[M]ore often, comparative effectiveness information has little impact at all as coverage is granted even in the absence of good
evidence, and payment for new interventions is determined by traditional formulas
divorced from consideration of evidence on comparative clinical effectiveness.”).
191
See PPACA sec. 6301(a), § 1181, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e (West Supp. 1A 2010); id.
sec. 6302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8.
192
Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d).
193
See supra note 48 (explaining the structure and membership of the PCOR Institute’s governing board).
194
See id.
195
See id.
196
The term “new governance” is intentionally used broadly here to cover different, if somewhat overlapping, schools of thought that favor breaking away from both
traditional public regulation and complete deregulation. The various theories have
numerous labels, including “new governance,” “reflexive law,” “responsible regulation,” “outsourcing regulation,” and “public/private.” These approaches share an in-
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involves public/private collaborations in various forms.
Thus, the
fact that private interests will have a significant role in directing the
PCOR Institute and, in turn, overseeing the new national CER program is not reason alone to dismiss this regulatory approach as biased
or illegitimate.
But as an innovative form of new governance, the PCOR Institute
seems poorly conceived. To succeed, new governance collaborations
must do more than simply enlist the participation of multiple public
and private actors and hope for the best. Fragmentation, opacity, and
198
unaccountability can hinder new governance approaches. Also, new
governance models must be careful of agency capture by powerful
stakeholders, especially because direct regulation to address power
imbalances may be less likely given the influence ceded to private ac199
Plus, new governance models must account for real human
tors.
behavior and the way stakeholders actually behave in collaborative set200
Moreover, when it comes to health care, even new govertings.
terest in participatory governance structures, tapping the expertise and capacity of private interests and nongovernmental actors, and horizontal rather than vertical oversight. The new governance paradigm also views regulatory power as diffused among
and arising from networks of public and private actors operating together through negotiated relationships. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (recognizing the pervasive
presence of private actors in governance); Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law:
Multiple Directions in Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 89 (2007) (exploring
the development of new governance perspectives in health care law); Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (summarizing theoretical insights of new governance scholars).
197
The Joint Commission, a private accrediting body for the nation’s hospitals and
other institutional providers, is one example. One of its committees, which features
public and private actors, wields significant influence in public governance by establishing quality standards that are then incorporated into the regulatory conditions of
participation in the Medicare program. See Freeman, supra note 196, at 610-12 (describing the committee as made up of professional, industrial, and government representatives). More recently, planning initiatives for public health emergencies have
demonstrated the importance of public/private collaborations, such as public health
departments looking to the business community for help in developing and implementing infectious disease control measures. See Hunter, supra note 196, at 106-09
(using the handling of the SARS outbreak to illustrate public/private collaboration).
198
See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 32-35 (2005)
(summarizing critiques of new governance theories).
199
See id. at 32-33.
200
See id. at 35; Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227, 236-37 (discussing a critique of the new governance model’s ability to predict and respond to human tendencies).

SAVER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2188

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/11/2011 7:12 PM

[Vol. 159: 2147

nance proponents recognize that without meaningful participation
from physicians—who perform key roles as gatekeepers and trusted
agents—new governance approaches will usually fail. Indeed, “[t]he
role of physicians is crucial in order for new governance in health care
201
to be successful.”
These considerations cast doubt on the PCOR Institute’s likely effectiveness. Although the PCOR Institute includes multiple stakeholders, including physician representatives, it does not sufficiently account
for the perspective of ordinary physicians in the clinical trenches. For
example, the PCOR Institute could, in theory, increase the interest of
frontline practitioners by eliciting their clinical views about the standards that should be applied to CER investigations or the treatment
comparisons most needed to improve delivery of care.
Yet the shared governance role of private industry has understandably raised physician concerns of politicized science and industry
bias. After all, certain CER studies may discredit the effectiveness of
particular drugs and devices or call into question the reimbursement
and coverage polices of particular health plans. Will private members
of the PCOR Institute’s governing board be able to support and advance independent CER studies that reflect critically on their constituencies’ products and policies? Wary physicians already doubt it. According to Harry Selker and Alastair Wood, the law “ced[es] substantial
influence to the medical products industries that have a major interest
202
They warn that CER should be
in the outcomes of such research.”
203
“free of the potential taint of commercial and political meddling.”
In partial recognition of bias concerns, PPACA applies modest
204
conflict-of-interest provisions to PCOR Institute board members. Also, the new law requires that most CER investigations undergo peer
review and that the PCOR Institute work with an expert methodology
committee to develop better and consistent standards, such as criteria
201

Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 245, 249 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006).
202
Harry P. Selker & Alastair J.J. Wood, Industry Influence on Comparative-Effectiveness
Research Funded Through Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2595, 2596 (2009).
203
Id. at 2597.
204
Among other things, disclosure of conflicts of interest is required, and members
of the governing board are to recuse themselves when they or family members have a
direct financial interest of any amount in the results of a CER investigation. PPACA
sec. 6301(a), § 1181(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(f)(2) (West Supp. 1A 2010). The same
disclosure is required when they or their family derive a financial benefit (over $10,000
annually) from an entity that owns or manufactures a product or service subject to a
CER investigation. Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(a)(4).
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for validity and feasibility, to apply to funded investigations. Nonetheless, doubts remain as to whether these safeguards will be sufficient. Many of the conflict-of-interest provisions seem dependent on
206
enforcement by the governing board. Plus, this would hardly be the
first instance in biomedical research where conflict-of-interest provisions as written in the books are not consistently followed or enforced
207
in actual practice.
The behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that led to the creation of the PCOR Institute has created additional transparency and accountability concerns. The House of Representatives’ health reform
bill, which ultimately did not become law, would have utilized a public
model for CER oversight by establishing a new center for CER within
208
the Agency for Healthcare and Research Quality (AHRQ). But heavy
lobbying by the Partnership to Improve Patient Care (PIPC) helped
convince Congress to move to a private/public model with the final
209
PIPC, despite including various medical profeshealth reform law.
205

Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(d).
For example, the statute simply states that members of the PCOR Institute will be
recused when they have an applicable conflict of interest, but does not describe how the
recusal request is initiated. Id. sec. 6301(a), § 1181(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(f)(2).
The most likely scenario is that the board as a whole will enforce the recusal provisions
against individual board members. Also, the PCOR Institute is supposed to ensure that
the members of expert advisory panels disclose conflicts of interest. Id. Again, the governing board as a whole would presumably have to undertake such actions.
207
See, e.g., Josephine Johnston, Conflict of Interest in Biomedical Research (reporting
the close relationship between biomedical research institutions and for-profit businesses), in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK 31, 32-33 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008); Gardiner Harris & Benedict Carey, Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at A1
(“Universities ask professors to report their conflicts but do almost nothing to verify
the accuracy of these voluntary disclosures.”); Rick Weiss, “Serious Misconduct” by NIH
Expert Found, WASH. POST, June 14, 2006, at A6 (reporting that a researcher traded valuable tissue specimens for money because of “lax oversight”).
208
The House reform bill also would have established an independent CER
Commission to oversee the activities of the CER program within the AHRQ. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 1401 (2009).
209
Since the Recovery Act’s initial heavy funding for CER, “[a] major goal” of PIPC
has been to “give industry a seat at the table” in deciding what CER studies to conduct.
Alicia Mundy, Drug Makers Fight Stimulus Provision, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at A4; see also
Howard Brody, Now It’s Time to Start Clearing the Land Mines..CER, HOOKED: ETHICS,
MED., AND PHARMA (Mar. 23, 2010, 4:59 PM), http://brodyhooked.blogspot.com/
2010/03/now-its-time-to-start-clearing-land.html (“PIPC has been waging a stealth
campaign, superficially applauding CER while trying hard behind the scenes to be sure
that CER never gets to grow any teeth.”). PIPC indeed publicly applauded the eventual CER provisions in the final health care reform law. See Press Release, P’ship to Improve Patient Care, PIPC Applauds New Health Care Bill’s CER Language (Mar. 23,
2010), available at http://www.improvepatientcare.org/news-media/pipc-applauds-new206
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sional societies in its coalition such as the American College of Cardiology, largely represents the pharmaceutical industry. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the powerful drug
industry trade group, formed the coalition, and PIPC has received
210
support from major pharmaceutical firms such as Merck.
E. Clinical Autonomy and the Technological Imperative
Even if very high-quality, bias-free CER data can be produced at a
reasonable cost, other factors suggest that physicians will be hesitant to
use this information. Sociological studies of medical practice reveal
that physicians highly value clinical autonomy, a preference reinforced
211
by medical custom and a strong sense of professionalism. Physicians
traditionally resist intrusions on their independent professional judgment and will buck interventions that seem to direct individual treat212
Physicians can prove quite formidable in evading
ment decisions.
and undermining attempts to change their practice patterns, including through the effective strategy of passive resistance. Because of
their strong preference for and expectations of clinical autonomy,
physicians remain especially distrustful of practice guidelines or coverage decisions that do not seem physician driven, but rather appear
213
motivated by institutional politics, cost control, or similar concerns.
Even initiatives to change practice patterns for quality reasons tend to

health-care-bill’s-cer-language (follow the hyperlink under “Attachment”) (“This legislation will help ensure that CER is used to help doctors and patients make the best
treatment decisions possible . . . .”).
210
Jonathan D. Salant & Aliza Marcus, Drugmakers Boost Lobbying To Police Drug
Comparisons, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2010, 16:49 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHjr0BP1zvgo.
211
ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 23-33, 137-57, 359-82 (Robert Bierstedt ed., 4th prtg. 1972).
212
See Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice: What (If Anything) Happens to
Professionalism?, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 5-6 (1996) (noting tensions between independent medical professionals and health care bureaucracies); Hall, supra note 25, at 451
(describing “clinical autonomy” as the medical profession’s “most sensitive nerve”);
Edward A. Pont, The Culture of Physician Autonomy: 1900 to the Present, 9 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 98, 100 (2000) (discussing the history of physician reactions to
government “encroachment[]”).
213
Hall, supra note 25, at 450-52; see also Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA
2708, 2713 (1987) (noting the difficulty of convincing physicians to follow National
Institutes of Health recommendations).
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fail unless they sufficiently preserve physicians’ ability to exercise in214
dependent discretion.
Ensuring greater physician input into the design of CER does not
necessarily resolve the clinical-autonomy problems. Studies of medical culture indicate that individual autonomy, more so than professional autonomy as a whole, is what matters to the typical physician.
Physicians’ training and professional orientation make them wary of
215
The fact that other
ceding clinical discretion even to their peers.
physicians developed a CER study may thus fail to assuage the individual physician’s concerns about loss of professional authority. Indeed,
CER relies on sophisticated statistical techniques to draw conclusions
from the experiences of groups of patients, rather than relying on an
individual physician’s impressions from isolated clinical experiences.
As with evidence-based medicine generally, this emphasis threatens
individual physician autonomy because it gives greater authority to
statisticians, institutional managers, academic researchers, and others
while seemingly devaluing the weight and influence of the individual
216
clinician’s judgment.
Recent physician focus-group discussions conducted by MedPAC
staff demonstrate the depth of physicians’ clinical autonomy con217
cerns regarding CER.
MedPAC researchers interviewed primary
and specialist physicians in a variety of practice settings. Some physician respondents firmly opposed CER. This group worried that payers and the government would use CER to dictate treatment through
mandatory practice guidelines. This group further believed that
“personal experience with a treatment was enough for them to make
218
One physician remarked, “We have our
treatment decisions.”
214

See James L. Reinertsen, Zen and the Art of Physician Autonomy Maintenance, 138
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 992, 993-94 (2003) (detailing common arguments that physicians use to defy evidence-based guidelines and protocols). For example, the TQM initiatives introduced in medical centers in the 1990s largely floundered, due in part to
clinical autonomy concerns. See Weber & Joshi, supra note 28, at 389-92. A more recent
example concerns health care institutions’ attempts to impose antibiotic-control policies. Although initiated for valid public-health reasons, the control programs have generated resistance because of physicians’ desire to control their own work. See Richard
S. Saver, In Tepid Defense of Population Health: Physicians and Antibiotic Resistance, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED., 431, 478-79 (2008).
215
See Hall, supra note 25, at 462-63.
216
See Marc A. Rodwin, The Politics of Evidence-Based Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 439, 440-41 (2001) (discussing shifts in power from physicians to other
decisionmakers).
217
See, e.g., Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 96-127.
218
Joan Sokolovsky, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 100-01.
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judgment. If we like something, if it works, great. If it doesn’t, then
219
we try something else.”
Related to physicians’ strong desire for professional discretion is
the “technological imperative.” Under this powerful medical norm,
physicians consider use of the latest technologies in the clinic as a sign
220
of improvement in care. Innovation, in this view, reflects medicine
working at its best and reinforces the physician’s esteemed role as
technocratic expert mediating new scientific advances for the benefit
of the patient. Accordingly, physicians highly value the clinical autonomy to switch to newer treatments and services when they see fit.
However, even with the best of intentions, this can lead some physicians to “embrace new procedures and technologies prematurely, be221
fore much evidence exists to support their enthusiasm.”
An anticipated benefit of CER is that it will demonstrate when new
treatments really seem to offer little improvement in effectiveness over
222
older treatments.
However, getting physicians to be more cautious
about embracing new technology will not be easy. The physician’s belief in the superiority of her own judgment, rightly or wrongly, is not
easily swayed by “better” data. As one commentator observes, doctors
“inevitably believe in their technologies and products, making it tricky
223
to get them to willingly lay down their arms.”
F. “Individualized” Medicine
As previously noted, some physicians find CER unpersuasive because they believe that it does not sufficiently account for the differ224
In fact, concern for what works
ences between individual patients.
best for the individual patient presents formidable translation barriers,
above and beyond questioning the relevance of particular CER data.
Physicians’ strong commitment to individualized medicine, an orienta219

Id. at 101; see also Mushlin & Ghomrawi, supra note 84, at e6(1) (“Unfortunately, there is still a widespread lack of understanding about what CER will do—and
fear that it will do more harm than good, in part by threatening individual physicians’
autonomy and professionalism.”).
220
See, e.g., Muriel R. Gillick, The Technological Imperative and the Battle for the Hearts
of America, 50 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 276, 276 (2007) (discussing, as an example of
the technological imperative, physicians’ uncritical adoption of the left ventricular assist device for treatment of advanced heart failure).
221
Noah, supra note 112, at 393-94.
222
See supra subsection III.B.4 (discussing the ROOBY trial that called into question the benefits of off-pump cardiac surgery).
223
See Wachter, supra note 14.
224
See supra subsection III.B.3.
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tion encouraged by medical ethics, health law, and professional norms,
remains in significant tension with CER’s group-based foundations.
Health care has traditionally been divided between individual and
population health, a fragmentation that can undermine overall health
225
care delivery.
At the individual health level, a physician provides
treatment tailored for a specific patient within the confines of the special doctor-patient relationship. Population health, in contrast, concerns the health of the aggregate number of individuals in the community and involves activities such as infectious-disease control and
226
surveillance reporting to public health agencies. For the community physician, the individual-health paradigm has typically dominated
over population health considerations. Physicians’ training, medical
norms, ethical guidance, and the law surrounding the doctor-patient
relationship all emphasize strong fidelity to each patient. This strong
emphasis on individualized medicine discourages consideration of the
227
Doing what is best for a single papopulation-health perspective.
tient can lead a physician to neglect population-health responsibilities, as has been seen with uneven reporting of infectious diseases to
228
public-health authorities and physicians’ imprudent conservation of
229
the antibiotic supply.
The dominance of the individual-health paradigm discourages
physicians’ receptiveness to CER. By privileging evidence gathered
from treatment interventions at the group or subgroup level, rather
than relying on isolated clinical experiences, CER aims to provide a
more scientific foundation for medical decisionmaking. But community physicians, following a predominantly individual-health perspective, favor any benefit to the patient at hand. In other words, CER asks
whether reliable evidence, generated from the experience of patient
225

See Arnold J. Rosoff, Policy Challenges in Modern Health Care, 26 J. LEGAL MED.
523, 525 (2005) (book review) (“[M]any of the core policy challenges facing health
care today involve the interaction between individual health and public health and the
inevitable tradeoffs that arise in trying to optimize health at both levels.”).
226
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 1011 (2d ed. 2008).
227
See Saver, supra note 214, at 454-61 (listing hindrances to physicians’ consideration of the public health perspective and concluding “that many physicians are rather
reluctant, passive defenders of population health”).
228
See, e.g., Janet S. St. Lawrence et al., STD Screening, Testing, Case Reporting, and
Clinical Partner Notification Practices: A National Survey of US Physicians, 92 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1784, 1787 (2002) (finding low physician compliance with laws that require
reporting of sexually transmitted diseases, an activity critical to population health surveillance efforts).
229
See Saver, supra note 214, at 460-61.
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groups, supports offering treatment A over treatment B in similar cases. However, the community physician more likely wants to know
which treatment—A, B, or something altogether different—might work
for this patient. Studies suggest physicians have stronger feelings of
obligation to individual, known patients than to larger group inter230
ests. This bias toward doing what possibly could benefit a particular
patient—a bias supported by current legal rules—makes it difficult to
231
advance the broader public interest in many aspects of health policy.
It similarly complicates physicians’ willingness to embrace CER.
Along these lines, some physicians worry that imprudent application of CER presents quality hazards. Under this view, CER generalizes from the results of the larger population as to what is best for a particular patient—an approach that can, unwittingly, lead to worse
medical care. Evidence-based medicine guidelines in the past have
been discredited by later, more refined evidence-based research that
showed significant need to vary “best practices” for different patients.
Harvard University physician Jerome Groopman, a frequent critic of
the government’s new CER agenda, warns that in its zeal to improve
the evidence base through CER, the government is imprudently push232
ing a one-size-fits-all approach that can worsen the quality of care.
According to Groopman, CER works best when the medical practices
compared are repetitive, mechanical, involve the same basic clinical
factors, and therefore can be standardized to a large degree across a
233
group of patients. But he cautions that many other medical practices are “significantly altered by the condition of the individual patient”
234
“[O]nce we depart
or “must be adapted to a particular person.”
from such mechanical procedures and impose a single ‘best practice’
235
on a complex malady, our treatment is too often inadequate.” The
MedPAC physician survey similarly indicated that many physicians

230

See, e.g., Donald A. Redelmeier & Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical Decisions for Individual Patients and for Groups, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1163-64 (1990).
231
William Sage refers to these duties to individual patients as “relational duties,”
which contrast with the physician’s “regulatory duties” to advance larger societal goals
for the health care system. William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the
Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497,
500-01 (2008).
232
Jerome Groopman, Health Care: Who Knows “Best”?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 11,
2010, at 12, 13.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
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worry that overreliance on CER will interfere with their ability to tailor
236
treatment to individual patients.
To be sure, not all proponents of individualized medicine view
CER as a threat or as a vehicle for “cookbook” medicine. Physicians
such as Pauline Chen argue that CER actually solidifies the individual
237
doctor-patient relationship. According to Chen, evidence of relative
ineffectiveness can counter the physician’s bias to try active medical
intervention to help the patient when better medical practice might
238
be to pursue a course of watchful waiting or to do nothing at all.
Other commentators similarly suggest that, if done right, CER
supports rather than undermines the physician’s ability to provide individualized care. “Personalized medicine” emphasizes using individual genetic information to select better treatments and biologically tailoring medical interventions to fit a patient’s circumstances and
239
needs. High-quality CER, if extended broadly to various subgroups
of patients, may yield important data for such efforts and significantly
240
advance the practice of personalized medicine.
But to work in this manner, CER will have to produce compelling
results that are broad and deep enough to capture the many genetic
and other biological differences between patients. This will necessitate
ongoing revision to CER investigations. It will also require confidence
that the underlying biological-marker tests are consistent and accurate
and that the data reveal meaningful differences in treatment responses
among patient subgroups. These preconditions seem daunting. So
far, personalized-medicine research has proven more difficult to conduct in practice than initially hoped, and therapies targeted to genetic
241
differences have yielded few real medical breakthroughs.
236

In summarizing the data, MedPAC commissioner Herb B. Kuhn observed that
“this issue of non-interference within the physician-patient relationship is loud and
clear.” Herb B. Kuhn, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 108.
237
See Pauline W. Chen, A Tool to Strengthen the Doctor-Patient Relationship, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 15, 16-17.
238
Id.
239
Alan M. Garber & Sean R. Tunis, Does Comparative-Effectiveness Research Threaten
Personalized Medicine?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1925, 1925 (2009).
240
See FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 6 (“[C]omparative effectiveness should complement the trend in medicine to develop personalized medicine—the ability to customize a drug and dose based on individual patient and disease
characteristics. One of the advantages of large comparative effectiveness studies is the
power to investigate effects at the sub-group level that often cannot be determined in a
randomized trial.”).
241
See Andrew Pollack, Patient’s DNA May Be Signal to Tailor Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2008, at A1, A16 (describing problems with nonpersonalized medicine); Su-
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G. Liability Concerns
Liability concerns also dampen physicians’ enthusiasm for CER.
242
According to MedPAC’s survey of physicians, some physicians deeply
worry about increased liability exposure if they end up disregarding
CER, even when they have valid reasons for doing so, such as indivi243
dually tailoring treatment to the patient. The concern is that a physician pursuing a care pathway not well supported by CER becomes
necessarily vulnerable to claims that she has adopted outmoded, un244
sound treatments. According to classic deterrence theory, physician
recognition of liability risk for disregarding CER should be a good
thing. This will encourage physicians to change their practice patterns
and conform to a CER-influenced standard of care. Alternatively, it
will encourage physicians dissatisfied with CER findings to contribute
evidence to new CER investigations to improve the quality of information generated. Under this view, physician liability concerns should
actually help to translate CER into medical practice more readily.
Although tort deterrence improves the quality of care in theory,
the reality has often been messier. The malpractice system experiences high costs and considerable problems in accurately determin245
Also, many other coning departures from the standard of care.
founding factors can greatly blunt the deterrence effect of the tort
system, which may exert the weakest influence over individual physi246
cians, as opposed to hospitals and other institutional providers.
Thus, without significant changes, the malpractice system will likely

san Gilbert, Behind the Curtain of Personalized Medicine: The Havasupai Tribe Settlement,
BIOETHICS FORUM ( June 14, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/
Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=4705&blogid=140 (discussing the need for continued
improvement in personalized medicine techniques like genetic tests).
242
See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
243
See Joan Sokolovsky, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 103.
244
See Fay Rozovsky, A Risk Manager’s Tour of the ARRA, AM. SOC’Y HEALTHCARE
RISK MGMT. 5 (May 2009), http://www.ashrm.org/ashrm/education/development/
monographs/Mono_ARRA.pdf.
245
See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Commentary, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System:
What Do We Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639,
1641-45 (2002) (reporting that instead of fault, the best predictor of the size of a tort
award is the severity of disability); David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025, 202931 (2006) (analyzing the costs involved with malpractice suits).
246
See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1623 (2002) (“[T]he deterrent
effect occurs primarily at the institutional level. Individual providers will always lack
strong tort incentives to improve care because most are sued so infrequently.”).
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not provide highly nuanced, fine-tuned incentives with regard to CER.
Instead, it will operate crudely, at best.
Moreover, complicating the analysis is that physicians’ concerns
about liability run in two directions. MedPAC’s physician survey, as
noted, indicated that some physicians worry about liability when depart247
ing from CER. But in a lose-either-way scenario, other physicians fear
that if they conform their practices to CER, they will face enhanced liability
exposure. These concerns arise for several reasons. Physicians may
rightly question whether lay juries will understand the importance of
CER, particularly where the research purports to discredit the effectiveness of commonly offered treatments. Physicians who adopt less-ismore treatment strategies based on CER may worry that juries will unfavorably view such actions as stinting on care. Also, as a doctrinal mat248
ter, existing medical custom ordinarily defines the standard of care,
not what research suggests should be done. Physicians may fear that
custom will trump CER in hard cases, regardless of whether custom actually works or is more effective than what CER suggests.
The lawsuit against Dr. Daniel Merenstein, a third-year resident
practicing in Virginia, stands out as a cautionary tale. Dr. Merenstein
wrote a widely discussed 2004 column in the Journal of the American
Medical Association, detailing how he was sued for not ordering a
screening test, the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test, for a patient
249
who later died of prostate cancer. The defense argued that evidencebased medicine practice guidelines amply supported Dr. Merenstein’s
250
The relevant guidelines questioned the routine ordering
decision.
of PSA tests in these situations because of false positive results, emo251
tional stress, costs, and other negative factors. The guidelines instead
recommended shared decisionmaking between patients and physicians
252
on whether to order the test. Meanwhile, the plaintiff put forth evidence that local custom among physicians in the community was to

247

See Joan Sokolovsky, Remarks at MedPAC Meeting, supra note 145, at 103.
See Osborn v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 125 (Ct. App. 1992)
(“[P]rofessionals are usually held only to a standard of custom and practice . . . .”). But
see Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV.
909, 913-917 (2002) (arguing that state courts have been retreating from the traditional rule that custom defines the medical standard of care and replacing it with a reasonable physician standard).
249
See Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004).
250
Id. at 15-16.
251
Id. at 15.
252
Id.
248
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253

order the test routinely.
Although the jury found Dr. Merenstein
not liable individually, it found against his residency program and
254
Dr. Merenstein and others have
awarded the plaintiff $1 million.
255
interpreted the case as a verdict against evidence-based medicine.
Under this view, the jury disregarded more rigorous, systematic evidence about the PSA test and sanctioned the residency program because other physicians still practiced the older, allegedly inferior
256
way. As Dr. Merenstein lamented, the malpractice system appeared
to be “punishing the translation of evidence into practice, impeding
257
improvements to care, and ensconcing practices that hurt patients.”
These concerns, discussed in the context of evidence-based medicine generally, clearly apply to CER. It may be, however, that physicians’ liability fears are overstated. Cases like Dr. Merenstein’s may not
accurately reflect how the malpractice system would handle most CER258
related disputes.
This would not be the first instance where physi259
cians overstate liability risks. But the concern about enhanced liability exists, whether accurate or not, and such perceptions can powerfully
motivate physician behavior. In short, physicians’ liability views make
them more tentative about embracing CER in daily clinical practice.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Considerable barriers, including most importantly the lack of
strong incentives for physicians to adapt to the evidence, impede
health care reform’s rollout of CER. Nonetheless, recognition of the
importance of the physician’s gatekeeper role suggests that initiatives
targeted to engage physicians more directly could help a great deal.
This Part considers a few promising options.
253

Id.
Id. at 16.
255
See, e.g., Darshak Sanghavi, Do We Have a Winner?: How to Reform the Broken Medical Malpractice System, SLATE, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2235027.
256
Merenstein, supra note 249, at 16.
257
Id.
258
See Mark A. Hall et al., Letter to the Editor, 291 JAMA 1697 (2004) (questioning
the general applicability of the Merenstein case because the jury may have found against
the residency program for other reasons than the adoption of evidence-based practice).
259
See, e.g., Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians’ Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued,
17 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 463, 463 (1992) (finding that physicians’ perception of
the risk of facing a malpractice suit was three times the actual risk); Am. Roentgen
Ray Soc’y, Radiologists Overestimate Their Overall Risk of Malpractice Lawsuits in Breast Imaging, SCI. DAILY, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/02/
090202175100.htm (reporting that radiologists perceived a thirty-five percent risk of
being sued in the next five years despite the actual risk being ten percent).
254
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A. Coverage Rules and Financial Incentives
A critical first step is to relax the restrictions on using CER for
260
reimbursement purposes.
Well-designed financial incentives could
jump-start physicians’ interest in comparative effectiveness. However,
development of such incentives requires that payers have greater flexibility to rely on CER when choosing to cover certain technology or
when deciding which procedures should receive higher payments
than others. While it is true that PPACA does not absolutely preclude
use of CER for reimbursement purposes, it makes it difficult to do
261
so. It is also true that the new law primarily imposes its restrictions
on linking CER with reimbursement on Medicare and other govern262
mental health care programs, not private payers. Yet easing the restrictions on Medicare alone could have a beneficial spillover effect
for the entire health care system. Medicare covers a significant share
263
As such a large payer, it comof patients in the market overall.
264
mands a powerful position to act as “first mover,” with private payers
more likely to follow.
More flexible application of Medicare’s “coverage with evidence
development” (CED) rules is one option to develop better synergy between reimbursement and CER. Under the CED rules, Medicare generally can condition payment for a promising new medical treatment
on beneficiaries enrolling in a clinical trial that will develop further
information about whether the treatment meets Medicare’s “reasona265
ble and necessary” coverage criteria.
Under this approach, Medi260

See supra Section I.F (explaining PPACA’s limitations on CER use).
See supra Section I.F.
262
Supra Section I.F.
263
As of 2008, Medicare covers approximately fifteen percent of United States residents. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Data Compendium, 2009 Edition, CENTERS
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., tbl.VII.4 (Dec. 2009), http://www.cms.gov/
DataCompendium/15_2009_Data_Compendium.asp. Twenty-three percent of total
national health care spending is for the Medicare program. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING: FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-05.pdf.
264
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
265
For Medicare’s general coverage criteria for physician services, see supra notes
185-87 and accompanying text. Medicare has formalized its CED approach though an
agency guidance document. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVCOVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at https://
ERAGE:
www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-documentdetails.aspx?MCDId=8. Conditioning payment on study participation is a particular
form of CED known as “Coverage With Study Participation.” Id. The CED process is,
however, not without its critics. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Tri261
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care will also generally require that participating physicians not offer
266
the intervention to patients not enrolled in the study.
The basic
point of the CED rules is to “move beyond yes/no coverage deci267
sions” that can prove difficult to make in the absence of good information. When applying CED status to a technology, Medicare allows limited access to it, so long as it is part of a clinical trial that can,
hopefully, yield more evidence about whether the technology meets
Medicare’s regular coverage criteria and should be covered on a program-wide basis.
Yet Medicare has so far used the CED authority on very few occa268
sions.
Information gathered during CED-reimbursed studies also
tends to concern general effectiveness, not comparative effectiveness,
269
due to the statutory criteria for Medicare coverage. Changes to the
Medicare statute and agency policies that allowed more frequent use
of the CED process and that made comparative effectiveness information matter more for future program-wide coverage decisions of
treatments introduced initially through the CED rules, would help increase physician receptiveness. Subjecting promising but unclear
treatments to CED would allow physicians (and patients) some discretion to adopt new technology, thus respecting physicians’ clinical autonomy concerns and accommodating their interest in exploring new
270
technology. Importantly, this would entail individual physicians participating more directly in the generation of comprehensive comparative effectiveness evidence, which hopefully would heighten their in-

als: Conscripting Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 366 (2010) (concluding the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ practices are “heavy-handed” and
contravene federal regulations).
266
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 265.
267
MedPAC Cites Challenges to Wide Use of Coverage with Evidence Development, 8 Med.
Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 767 (Nov. 18, 2009).
268
See Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare’s National Coverage Decisions for Technologies,
1999–2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1620, 1623 (2008) (“CMS used its CED policy in seven decisions through 2007 . . . .”).
269
For the criteria for Medicare coverage, see supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. For complaints about the limitations of CED, see Mindy Yochelson, “Coverage
with Evidence Development” Falling Short, Former CMS Official Says, 9 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y
Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 174 (Mar. 17, 2010). Cf. David Orentlicher, Making Research a
Requirement of Treatment: Why We Should Sometimes Let Doctors Pressure Patients to Participate in Research, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 20, 20-22 (noting the need
for better comparative effectiveness information and suggesting that physicians
should be able to condition continued care on their patients’ willingness to participate in comparative-efficacy trials).
270
See supra Section III.E.
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terest in the research results. This would also develop a more robust
evidence base to guide future coverage and treatment decisions.
In addition to linking coverage of treatments to evidence of comparative effectiveness, payers could offer physicians financial incentives for adhering to clinical practice guidelines based on solid CER.
Guideline implementation studies from different medical disciplines
indicate that when physicians receive financial rewards, guideline ad271
herence has been somewhat more successful.
Financial incentives
continue to be one of the most powerful tools for driving physician
272
behavior.
Such incentives can improve the often only short-term
impact of educational appeals by giving physicians a continual interest
273
in reevaluating their practice patterns. Also, compared to other implementation measures, such as treatment mandates or outright coverage denials, financial incentives may be more physician friendly be274
cause they better preserve physician discretion. Financial incentives
do not require a particular course of treatment, allowing room for the
clinician to tailor care to the particular patient as she sees fit and earn
(or not earn) a particular reward. This approach is more compatible
275
with physicians’ strong desire for professional autonomy and their
276
commitment to individualized medicine.
Financial incentives cannot eradicate all physician concerns about
the persuasiveness of CER. Further, there is a possible danger in trying to override those concerns, some of which raise legitimate thera277
peutic issues, by financially rewarding physicians to follow CER in all
cases. Not all CER guidelines will be of high quality. Some may suffer
271

Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 682-83 (2001).
272
See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 171 (1997) (“[T]here is no dispute
about whether financial incentives will work . . . .”); cf. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE,
MONEY & MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 97-105 (1993) (discussing the
possible dangers of using financial incentives to increase or decrease services); Fred J.
Hellinger, The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed Care Plans:
A Review of the Evidence, 53 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 294, 311 (1996) (“[F]inancial incentives are a key element in explaining the success of managed care plans in reducing
the utilization of health services.”).
273
See Hall, supra note 25, at 480.
274
See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives
to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 174-77 (1996) (observing that the alternative of
caps on specific services would restrict physicians’ ability to tailor care to the needs of a
given patient).
275
See supra Section III.E.
276
See supra Section III.F.
277
See supra Sections III.B, III.F.
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from lack of rigor or industry bias. Appropriate criteria need to be
applied consistently to identify which CER-influenced guidelines are
sufficiently credible. Entities such as the PCOR Institute or the AHRQ
could play a key role by certifying particular CER-influenced guide278
The certification process ideally would evalines as high quality.
luate guideline credibility based on generally recognized best practices, such as representation of multispecialties among the guideline
279
authors and disclosure by authors of financial conflicts of interest.
Firmer linkage of financial incentives and CER could not only increase physician receptiveness but also provide a feedback loop that
helps improve the quality of CER generally. Well-designed financial
incentives—especially those targeted to the performance of groups of
physicians instead of individual clinicians—encourage physicians to
pool information about treatments, as well as to monitor the treatment
280
This increased information flow may
choices of other physicians.
help better identify where the current state of CER needs improvement. Indeed, even if the initial CER-influenced guidelines are weak
or subject to differing clinical opinion, the financial incentives provide a continual reason for physicians to pay attention to comparative
effectiveness. This helps combat physician tune-out and challenges
281
physicians to recommend changes for improving the guidelines.
B. Malpractice Liability Incentives
Reforms should also address physicians’ malpractice liability fears
282
about CER. This could be accomplished in several ways. Malpracticeliability-reduction incentives could be linked to physicians’ com278

Other commentators urge a greater role for the private market in improving
the quality of clinical practice guidelines. One such proposal is to have private firms
compete in offering high-quality guidelines to physicians. The firms would also be financially responsible for any injuries caused by substandard guidelines that they
promulgated, thus aligning the firms’ and physicians’ incentives for quality improvement. See Avraham, supra note 116, at 39-40 (explaining the benefits of private-actor
involvement in health care regulation).
279
See generally Roberto Grilli et al., Practice Guidelines Developed by Specialty Societies:
The Need for a Critical Appraisal, 355 LANCET, Jan. 8, 2000, at 103, 104-05 (evaluating
existing guidelines and finding many of them lacking).
280
See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 408 (1996) (“[W]e have good reason to hope that financial incentives will help move providers to pool their information and eliminate
some . . . overcare.”).
281
Cf. Hall, supra note 25, at 479 (making a similar point about incentives and
guidelines more generally).
282
See supra Section III.G.
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pliance with guidelines based on solid CER. Research suggests that
physicians comply with recommended guidelines at somewhat better
rates when they receive a reduction in malpractice insurance pre283
A more comprehenmiums in return for following the guidelines.
sive malpractice-linked initiative would provide liability safe harbors to
physicians who comply with guidelines based on solid CER. Under
such an approach, physicians would enjoy complete immunity or benefit from a rebuttable presumption that they met the standard of care
if they could demonstrate that high-quality evidence of comparative
effectiveness supported their treatment choice.
Because such approaches “would give physicians a legal incentive
to practice evidence-based medicine, liability reform could be an ef284
fective way to foster the uptake of CER findings.”
Indeed, given
physicians’ deep concerns about a malpractice-liability system run
amok, they would likely welcome some form of tort relief. As such,
this option would prove far more physician-friendly than limiting
285
reimbursement coverage based on CER.
C. Academic Detailing
Greater use of academic detailing could also increase physician
receptiveness to CER. In an attempt to “fight fire with fire,” academic
detailing tries to copy the highly successful marketing techniques that
pharmaceutical firms use to promote their medications to physi286
Academic detailing embraces pharmaceutical firms’ persuacians.
sion methods but endeavors to provide more balanced information
compared to what physicians learn from drug-company advertising
287
and related sources. The persuasion strategies include utilizing physician peer educators to promote the benefits of a particular product
through face-to-face meetings, physician interviews to assess baseline
knowledge and prescribing motivations, and the deployment of con283

See Mello, supra note 271, at 683.
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Medical Liability Reform in
Federal Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 3 (2009).
285
See id.
286
See Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Educational Outreach (“Academic Detailing”) To Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549 (1990).
287
See PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, FACT SHEET—ACADEMIC DETAILING: EVIDENCE-BASED PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 1 (2009), available at
http://
www.prescriptionproject.org/tools/fact_sheets/files/0007.pdf (“[T]he approach resembles the marketing approach of drug companies, but instead . . . present[s] balanced, evidence-based information about common prescribing choices without a
sales agenda.”).
284
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288

cise, consistent informational messages in discussing the product.
Academic-detailing initiatives have demonstrated moderate success in
bolstering quality and improving physician adherence to practice
289
guidelines across a variety of medical disciplines.
With regard to CER, academic detailers could communicate particular comparative effectiveness study information to physicians and
encourage them to adapt treatment practices accordingly. Part of the
appeal of this approach is that if the right physician representatives
are chosen as CER promoters, this can leverage physicians’ interest in
what their peers do and the influence of local opinion leaders in the
290
medical community, which offers more power than simply publicizing CER study results.
Unfortunately, the national CER program does not yet seem to
contemplate academic detailing to a significant degree. PPACA does
task the Office of Communication and Knowledge Transfer (the Communication Office), a unit within the AHRQ, with general responsibility
291
for dissemination of CER results.
The dissemination methods described in the statute, although not meant to be an exhaustive list, are
for the most part more passive educational approaches, such as developing a publicly available database of CER information or using
clinical-decision support technology to deliver the information to phy292
PPACA further provides that the Communication Office
sicians.
should regularly collect “feedback” from physicians and other stake293
holders about the “value of the information disseminated,” perhaps
opening the door to useful detailing techniques such as baseline assessments of physicians’ knowledge and motivations in ordering certain treatments. But the statute does not expressly mention academic
detailing and is largely silent about other interactive methods of information dissemination.
288

See id. at 2.
See, e.g., id. (summarizing evidence showing that “interactive techniques like
academic detailing are the most effective means to improve physician practices and
patient outcomes”); Michael Allen et al., Family Physicians’ Perceptions of Academic Detailing: A Quantitative and Qualitative Study, 7 BMC MED. EDUC., no. 36 (2007),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/7/36 (discussing the features of academic
detailing that physicians find most educational); James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines
and Policies: Can They Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 783, 787 (2005) (concluding that outreach methods are the “most effective,
albeit costly, method” of modifying physician behavior).
290
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
291
PPACA sec. 6301(b), § 937, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37 (West Supp. 1A 2010).
292
Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(a)(1).
293
Id. sec. 6301(b), § 937(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-37(c).
289
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As such, much depends on how the PCOR Institute, the Communication Office, and other relevant entities will choose to conduct
CER dissemination initiatives. In a welcome development, the AHRQ
is using some portion of its Recovery Act stimulus funding to support
academic detailing. The agency has asked for proposals from contractors to help design academic detailing programs promoting compara294
While such initiatives are encouragtive effectiveness information.
ing, to engage the physician audience effectively, academic detailing
should become a more prominent and consistent feature of the national CER program.
D. Comparative Implementation Research
A final recommendation follows from heeding the important insight of the CER movement: anecdotal impressions, best intentions,
and custom can be misleading—look instead to solid comparative evidence about what works best. In other words, in seeking to support
CER, the health care system should deliberately experiment with, and
compare different strategies for, translating it into clinical practice.
Many possible methods—such as information dissemination through
peer educators or financial incentives for guideline compliance—
seem intriguing, but they have not been systematically evaluated
against each other in terms of effectiveness rates for fostering CER uptake by physicians. And policymakers and regulators may consider entirely new implementation methods in the future. Given health care
reform’s record funding for research comparing the effectiveness of
different treatments, it seems prudent also to invest heavily in research that compares the effectiveness of different CER implementation
strategies. As Elizabeth Docteur and Robert Berenson have observed,
[H]owever great the potential importance of new research findings to be
generated through new CER, there is greater marginal value to be gained
from devoting additional resources to investigating why evidence so often
has a limited and slow impact on practice, evaluating policies and practices that improve uptake of treatments with demonstrated effectiveness,
disseminating effective implementation strategies, and implementing
295
changes in incentives or other initiatives that prove effective.

294

See Bronwyn Mixter, Congressional Leaders Praise AHRQ for Funding “Academic Detailing” Program, 9 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 249 (Apr. 21, 2010).
295
DOCTEUR & BERENSON, supra note 37, at 10; see also Lauer & Collins, supra note
120, at 2183 (“There is increasing recognition that the processes of dissemination and
implementation are legitimate targets for rigorous scientific evaluation.”).
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A viable national CER program simply needs better evidence about
what works best for translating the research results into clinical practice.
Yet it remains unclear whether the government’s new CER agenda will
allocate sufficient resources to comparative-implementation research or
296
make effective use of it. The now-disbanded Federal CER Council
seemingly recognized the critical need for such research, but ultimately
downgraded CER’s importance by characterizing it as a “secondary in297
vestment[].” Somewhat in contrast, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
has advised that “[k]nowledge translation research must be a high
298
Yet PPACA provides only lukewarm support for engaging
priority.”
in rigorous comparative analysis of implementation strategies and does
299
not expressly require spending CER funds for such investigations.
Much therefore depends on the discretion of the PCOR Institute and
other relevant entities in implementing the new national CER program. Hopefully, they will follow the IOM’s suggested approach by
continually looking to and heavily investing in much-needed implementation research.
CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that the new national CER program will
not function as a stand-alone proposition. It remains but one component of a more comprehensive reform agenda that will affect the
health care system through multifaceted, interconnected levers. For
example, PPACA authorizes the newly created Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation to explore new payment models in order to
300
Also, the new law creates the
provide stronger rewards for quality.
Independent Medicare Advisory Board to reign in governmental

296

See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
FEDERAL CER COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 43.
298
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 7, at 159.
299
For example, the Communication Office, see supra text accompanying note 291,
is required to create tools for organizing CER information and to seek feedback from
end users about the value of information disseminated. PPACA sec. 6301(b), § 937, 42
U.S.C.A. § 299b-37 (West Supp. 1A 2010). Also, the Comptroller General is supposed
to review the national CER program at least every five years, looking to “the effect of
the dissemination of such [CER] findings on reducing practice variation and disparities in health care, and the effect of the research conducted and disseminated on innovation and the health care economy of the United States.” Id. sec. 6301(a),
§ 1181(g)(2)(A)(iv), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(g)(2)(A)(iv). But the statute does not require that specific amounts of CER funds be spent for implementation research.
300
See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
297
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301

health care spending.
Because CER is not intended to, and need
not, shoulder the full responsibilities for bending the cost curve and
improving quality of care, this Article’s detailed focus on the weak rollout of CER may seem misplaced.
But these other initiatives will take a long time to implement, and
302
their ultimate impact may be small. Moreover, CER’s intriguing potential is that it has the theoretical power to reinforce and amplify
other reform initiatives significantly. Indeed, a viable CER program
seems indispensible to health care reform’s ultimate success no matter
how reform on the ground evolves and develops in coming years. After all, a solid comparative effectiveness evidence base is needed to
address health care system fundamentals, such as deciding which services to support, determining the relative value patients receive from
the system, highlighting when common treatment pathways need
reexamination, and identifying when spending cuts undermine very
303
If CER is to complement other reform initiatives in
effective care.
this manner, however, the health care system must do more than
simply develop the evidence. It must also be in a position to act on
the information generated. In short, to even begin fulfilling some of
its promise, CER must be deployed under better starting conditions.
This means paying a great deal more attention to how physicians, the
critical gatekeepers, will likely respond and directly confronting the
serious risks of physician tune-out and indifference.

301

Id.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
303
Cf. Mushlin & Ghomrawi, supra note 84, at e6(1)-(2) (“[C]hanges in coverage
and care delivery must in fact be guided by knowledge about what is valuable to preserve in our health care system.”).
302

